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1 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every "contract, combination. . . . or conspiracy" in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
2
Horizontal restraints on price are illegal per se unless they are
ancillary to an economic integration generating a large cost savings or
other efficiency, tantamount to the creation of a new product. Those
0
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akin to the very trusts (cartels) that the antitrust laws were
intended to prohibit. Through a horizontal agreement to fix price,
competitors may act collectively as would a monopolist, creating
the identical harm to competition and consumers.
Perhaps the most difficult issue in applying § 1, from both a
legal and economic perspective, is identifying an agreement
among competitors to fix prices when the evidence of agreement
is entirely circumstantial. 3 In particular, courts and commentators
have debated for decades whether parallel price changes by
oligopolists who recognize their interdependence provide a sufficient basis for a court to infer an unlawful horizontal agreement
under Sherman Act § 1, and if not what additional circumstantial
evidence is required to prove a conspiracy. 4 Parallel pricing cases
challenge courts to distinguish between unilateral and concerted
conduct. 5
The difficult issue of proving an agreement to fix prices from
parallel pricing and other circumstantial evidence is at the core of
restraints that do not fall within the per se prohibition are illegal if unreasonable. See generally, Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of
HorizontalRestraints, 36 ANTITRUST BuLL. 733 (1991).
3 When the evidence for an agreement is circumstantial, the fact of
an agreement must be inferred even if the evidence is believed. Circumstantial evidence is distinguished from direct evidence of an agreement,
such as the testimony of a remorseful conspirator that "we met and
agreed to the following conduct" or a written memorialization of the
agreement. Although direct evidence may be contradicted by other evidence or challenged as to credibility, it resolves a matter at issue if
believed. In contrast, additional inference is required to resolve the matter at issue when the evidence offered is circumstantial. 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 777 (1992).
4 Although parallel pricing is the focus of this article, similar infer-

ential issues arise with other forms of parallel conduct, such as parallel
refusals by competitors to deal with a common customer or supplier.
5 The Supreme Court has termed this distinction "basic" to the
Sherman Act. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 767 (1984) citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 761 (1984); accord, United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
307 (1919).

Section I dilemmas : 145

antitrust's longstanding efforts to attack the "oligopoly problem."
This term refers to the concern that an industry characterized by a
small number of sellers will exercise market power. During the
1950s and 1960s, when the structural school of antitrust analysis
was dominant, it was commonly thought that oligopolies would
normally succeed in raising prices above competitive levels either
through reaching a price-fixing agreement, or merely by interacting while recognizing their interdependence. The latter possibility,
termed "tacit collusion," was thought to be nearly inevitable in
oligopolies. Although antitrust law ultimately rejected the strategy
of attacking the oligopoly problem by deeming "conscious parallelism" in prices to be an agreement in violation of Sherman Act
§ 1, that proposal was widely debated.
In contrast, antitrust commentators writing from the more
modem Chicago school perspective typically dismiss the possibility of noncompetitive behavior unless thie firms actually cooperate. Under this view, the oligopoly problem is identical to the
problem of uncovering and prosecuting price fixing. But interfirm
coordination is not inevitable, and its likelihood depends upon
certain structural characteristics of the industry that vary from one
market to another. Since the mid-1970s, the Chicago approach to
antitrust has come to dominate courts and commentary, 6 the term
"tacit collusion" has come to mean no more than an agreement
proved through circumstantial evidence, 7 and an economic analy6
See generally, e.g., Calvani & Silbarium, Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline, 35 ANTrrmuST BULL. 123 (1990); Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANT==RusT
L.J. 645, 645 n.1 (1989); Baker, Book Review, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 919

(1989).

Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1993), at text accompa7

nying note 51. As a matter of logic, an express agreement (in which the
parties provide each other with explicit assurances, usually verbal, that
they will carry out their promises) proved through circumstantial
evidence is not the same as a tacit understanding (in which no such assurances are given). See Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007
(9th Cir. 1965) ("[a] knowing wink can mean more than words"); R. PosNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 72 (1976) (in tacit collusion, "one seller communi-
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sis of the structural features of the industry environment that
make coordination more or less plausible has become relevant to
the determination of whether an agreement exists in a parallel
pricing case.
This article highlights the implications of theoretical and
empirical developments in economics since the rise of the
Chicago school for the way antitrust addresses the oligopoly problem. Section I describes the way economists understand oligopoly
behavior today. This section explains that the most important contemporary economic development for Sherman Act § 1 jurisprudence is the recognition that, in an economic environment
conducive to coordination, an agreement in the legal sense will
often be unnecessary for coordination to occur. As will be seen,
this insight creates two serious dilemmas for antitrust policy.
The first dilemma, set forth in section II of this article, arises
in the application of Sherman Act § 1 in parallel pricing cases.
The dilemma points out the way insights from contemporary economic theory can discourage courts from inferring agreements to
fix price. The first horn of the dilemma emerges from the observation that if the industry's economic environment is not conducive
to coordination, it will be irrational for the firms to engage in the
process of negotiating a common understanding and exchanging
cates his 'offer' by reducing output, and the offer is 'accepted' by the
actions of his rivals in restricting output as well"). Because a tacit agreement is not logically identical to an agreement proved with circumstantial
evidence, it is possible to imagine having circumstantial evidence of an
express agreement (e.g., the parties met in a hotel room one day and
raised price the next), or direct evidence of a tacit agreement (e.g., the
manager of each firm involved testifies that the firms reached an agreement through the exchange of advance announcements of price
increases). Nevertheless, it is appropriate to apply a single legal standard
to identify an agreement under Sherman Act § 1, regardless of whether
the agreement is tacit or express, because a tacit agreement to fix price
and a concealed express agreement will look the same to a judge or jury.
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. Rav. 1562, 1575 (1969); see Yao & DeSanti, Game Theory and
the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTrrruST BULL. 113 (1993), at
text accompanying notes 38-39 (from the perspective of game theory,
there is no distinction between tacit and express collusion).
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mutual assurances that the law terms an agreement. A court that
recognizes that coordination is implausible for this reason will be
slow to construe circumstantial evidence as demonstrating an
agreement. If instead an economic analysis demonstrates that the
industry is fertile ground for coordination, the second horn of the
dilemma appears. In an environment conducive to coordination,
collective decision making supported by the exchange of assurances of compliance (i.e., an agreement) may be unnecessary for
the industry to reach a coordinated marketplace outcome. If the
observed market outcomes are consistent with what coordinating
firms could reach absent an agreement, as may often be the case,
then a court may reasonably conclude that it would be irrational
for the sellers to risk antitrust liability by agreeing. As courts
come to recognize the second horn of this dilemma, they will
experience a reluctance to infer an agreement in many industries
in which the economic environment is conducive to effective
coordination, in the absence of direct evidence that the firms
agreed. Whether the economic environment is conducive to coordination or not, the first dilemma suggests that courts will become
more reluctant to infer an agreement to fix price from circumstantial evidence including parallel pricing.
The second dilemma for antitrust policy, discussed in section
III of this article, emerges from the first dilemma. On the one
hand, the first dilemma implies that it is likely to become more
difficult to prove an agreement from circumstantial evidence. On
the other hand, contemporary economics suggests that it has
become more important for antitrust to address oligopoly behavior
than previously thought. Coordinated behavior, leading to higher
than competitive prices, while not inevitable, will nevertheless
occur even under circumstances in which reaching a price-fixing
agreement would be irrational. Oligopolies may in consequence
exercise market power under circumstances in which Chicago-oriented commentators would find that result unlikely.
This dilemma returns the oligopoly problem to the center of
contemporary debates over antitrust policy. As antitrust's traditional tool for attacking the oligopoly problem-proving an agreement under Sherman Act § 1-has been blunted through the
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operation of the first dilemma, the problem itself has simultaneously come to appear more serious. Through the operation of the
second dilemma, recent developments in economics imply that
the oligopoly problem is simultaneously less tractable through
prosecution under Sherman Act § 1 and more troublesome for the
economy than is recognized by the Chicago-oriented antitrust
mainstream.
A concluding section of this article, section IV, suggests two
ways of addressing the oligopoly lacuna in antitrust enforcement.
The first remedial approach involves merger enforcement. The
prohibition against anticompetitive mergers has long been understood as aimed in large part at preventing mergers likely to
enhance coordination. Merger enforcement has traditionally
applied a broad brush to that task: antitrust enforcers and courts
typically presume that the coordination becomes more likely or
more effective when concentration increases significantly in those
oligopolies with a market structure conducive to coordination.
Although contemporary economic theory does not undermine the
statistical prediction on which the traditional presumption is
based, contemporary economics does promise to permit courts
and enforcers examining acquisitions to differentiate, in many
cases, those mergers that are likely to make coordination worse
from other mergers likely to destabilize coordination. To the
extent such discrimination is possible, enforcers can improve their
ability to target merger enforcement to address the oligopoly
problem.
The second approach to attacking the oligopoly problem
involves the increased use of Federal Trade Commission rulemaking to prohibit practices facilitating oligopoly coordination. This
remedial approach can be employed regardless of whether the
challenged practices have been adopted unilaterally or through
concerted action.
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I. The oligopoly problem in contemporary economic theory
Industrial organization economists and antitrust commentators
writing in the tradition of the structural school, the dominant
approach in the 1950s and 1960s, typically argued that parallel
pricing by oligopolists could be expected to result in high prices
comparable to what the firms would achieve were the firms not
forbidden by Sherman Act § 1 from cartelizing expressly. In an
oligopoly setting,8 each firm necessarily pays attention to the
price and output decisions of its rivals. Each firm is aware that its
rivals will react to any change in price or output it makes; the
industry interacts under conditions of oligopolistic interdependence. As a result, in the view of commentators at mid-century,
the firms will likely be led to behave less aggressively toward
each other than they would were they competing with a large
number of rivals. Less aggressive firm behavior limits the competitive pressure on prices, and, in consequence, can be expected
to generate prices above those that would lead firms to earn
merely the economic profits that competition would allow. This
reasoning suggests that higher than competitive prices are nearly
inevitable in oligopolies. 9
The oligopolies considered in this article are presumed to be sufficiently stable to make plausible the repeated interaction implicit in the
idea of interdependence. Although this assumption will plausibly characterize many if not most oligopolies, it is least likely to hold when significant new competition (e.g., through large-scale entry, or through a major
expansion or innovation by an incumbent) is frequent or imminent,
because a new competitor may prefer competition to any plausible coordinated understanding. See infra at note 117.
9 Edward Chamberlin argued that each oligopolist will be reluctant
to cut price because it recognizes that its rivals will match. "Since the
result of a cut by any one is inevitably to decrease his own profits, no one
will cut, and although the sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there were a monopolistic agreement
s

between them." E.

CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPErI-

48 (1933). Many commentators took from Chamberlin the lesson
that supracompetitive prices were nearly inevitable in oligopolies. See
generally, G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACr 122-23, 131-37 (1958).
TION
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In 1964, George Stigler, a University of Chicago professor
who would later win a Nobel Prize in economics, published
an extremely influential economic article implicitly challenging
the view that supracompetitive oligopoly pricing is nearly
inevitable.' 0 Stigler profoundly changed the way economists
understand coordination among oligopolists; 1 and his analysis has
12
also influenced antitrust law.
Stigler's primary contribution was to point out that cooperating firms must do more than merely identify the terms of their
understanding; they must also maintain their consensus against the
incentives of firms to deviate from it (cheat). Often a firm can
increase the quantity it sells dramatically by undercutting the
cooperative price slightly. Even though the firm must accept a
lower price to achieve this result, it may find the temptation irresistible when the lower price remains in excess of cost. The firm
may well prefer to receive a substantial increase in the quantity
sold, albeit while earning a slightly lower price-cost margin on
10

Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).

E.g., Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATION 356-57 (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds.
1989) (describing Stigler's "classic" article and terming Stigler's understanding of oligopoly behavior as a problem of policing a tacitly collusive arrangement as "now the norm"). Joe S. Bain, the leading industrial
organization economist before Stigler, acknowledged that oligopolists
may have an incentive to cut price in describing the oligopoly equilibrium as the result of "a counter-pull between joint profit-maximizing and
independent profit-maximizing motives." J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 120 (2d ed. 1968). But Bain devoted little attention to this issue, and
when he did address it, he noted that sellers often anticipate and address
the incentive for independent price concessions by "the development of
supplementary collusive uniformities (express or tacit)." Id. at 313. In
contrast, Stigler's discussion elevates the issue of cartel policing to one
of fundamental importance in determining whether an oligopoly can successfully raise prices.
12
One important vehicle through which Stigler's article entered the
legal literature was Posner, supra note 7. For an example of the influence
of Stigler on Chicago-oriented economic commentary on antitrust policy,
1

INDUSTRIAL

see generally Y.

(1982).

BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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each unit than it would earn under the cooperative arrangement, to
the alternative of complying with the terms of the understanding.
Such a firm would prefer to compete rather than cooperate, and it
would undercut any cooperative understanding with its rivals.
Recognizing this prospect, its rivals may not find it worthwhile to
cooperate in the first instance. Indeed, the unilateral incentive to
deviate on a cooperative arrangement to fix price, highlighted by
Stigler, is the very market force by which competition insures low
prices and high output to the benefit of consumers and the economy.
Stigler's insight led to the recognition that it is far from
inevitable that oligopolists behave noncompetitively. 13 Under certain structural conditions, firms will have a powerful incentive to
cheat on any cooperative understanding; if these conditions are
present, cooperation is unlikely to persist (or to be achieved in the
first instance). The following examples of such conditions are by
no means exhaustive. 1 4 Firms may have a strong incentive to cheat
if captive production or nonprice competition permits them to
increase sales secretly,1 5 if they can increase sales greatly by win13
Cf.Elzinga, New Developments on the Cartel Front,29 ANTITRUST
BULL. 3, 6-7 (1984) (the lesson that collusion was not inevitable in
oligopolies may also have been suggested by the complexity of the
express agreement to fix prices uncovered in the electrical equipment
industry around 1960).
14
A list of practices facilitating collusion has become a staple of
both economics texts and antitrust monographs. See, e.g., F.M. ScMMER

& D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
235-315 (3d ed. 1990); D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 208-38 (1990); R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 55-61.
15 See Ginsburg, Nonprice Competition, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 83
1993) (highlighting the significance of nonprice competition as a method
of cheating on a horizontal agreement). But cf. Stigler, supra note 10, at
56 ("[s]ome forms of non-price competition will be easier to detect than
price-cutting because they leave visible traces (advertising, product quality, servicing, etc.) but some variants will be elusive (reciprocity in purchasing, patent licensing arrangements)"). For competition on nonprice
dimensions to substitute completely for competition on price, the nonprice dimensions must, as a group, substitute perfectly for price from the
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ning a handful of contracts with large buyers, or if they can avoid
the risk of punishment by their rivals through signing long-term
contracts with buyers. Conversely, in order to maintain the terms
of a consensus on price against the incentives of individual firms
to deviate unilaterally, the cooperating firms must find ways of
monitoring each other's compliance with their understanding, and
credibly threatening to punish those who cheat on the deal. Only
then will cooperating firms find it worthwhile to stick with the
terms of their arrangement rather than deviate from it.
Developments in economic theory since Stigler's 1964 article
have deepened the economic profession's understanding of
oligopoly behavior. Stigler's identification of the three problems a
cartel must solve in order to cooperate successfully-identifying
the terms of the cooperative understanding, detecting deviation
from those terms, and punishing that deviation-remains the
cornerstone of the economic analysis of what is now termed coordination. 16 Yet several important economic insights postdate
perspective of the marginal consumer of the product, and they must be as
inexpensive for the firm to alter as price. Whether this is the case will
turn on the facts of the individual industry.
16
The terminology employed by economists to describe the result of
nonindependent decision making by firms has altered as economic theory
has developed. Traditionally, economists described the joint decision and
exchange of assurances by which a cartel is formed as "collusion" or
"cooperation." In contrast, the term "noncooperative oligopoly behavior"
was used to describe both competition (interactions in which firms earn
no monopoly rents) and the supracompetitive pricing that may have
resulted, without cooperation, when firms are aware that their rivals will
react to their decisions. "Noncooperative oligopoly behavior" encompassed well known oligopoly solution concepts such as those of Cournot,
Bertrand, and Stackelberg. In the legal debate from the 1950s and 1960s
over "conscious parallelism," these noncooperative outcomes were
thought likely to result from "mere oligopoly interdependence" (short of
tacit or express collusion). Because the term "collusion" carries with it
the legal idea of an agreement, this article will avoid that usage in discussing the older economic concept of cooperation, but employ the term
when referring to the legal concepts of "express collusion" and "tacit collusion." The contemporary repeated game perspective on oligopoly
behavior, has led some economists to speak of "coordination" rather than
"'cooperation," and this article adopts that usage. See Willig, Merger
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Stigler's pathbreaking analysis. As post-Stiglerian insights
become as commonplace to courts as they are to economists, they
will likely give force to the two antitrust policy dilemmas discussed in sections II and III of this article. The remainder of this
section describes these contemporary economic insights into coordination.
A. From one-shot games to repeatedgames

Stigler discussed cooperation in terms of an economic model
in which each firm makes only one decision: whether to cooperate
or compete. This setting is termed a "one-shot game" in the contemporary language of economic theory. Stigler established the
conditions under which each firm would prefer to cooperate rather
than to compete. In the terminology of static oligopoly models,
these are the conditions under which cooperation is a dominant
strategy for every firm in the industry.
From a contemporary economic perspective, industry behavior
is understood as emerging from a repeated game rather than from
the one-shot game studied by Stigler. 17 Firms often know they will
interact with the same rivals again and again. Firms may in consequence base their present decisions on the way their rivals
behaved in the past. Firms may also recognize that their current
decisions may affect rival responses in the future, and thus influence future rewards. The outcome (equilibrium) of the repeated
game is a path for prices and output from the present into the disAnalysis, Industrial OrganizationTheory, and Merger Guidelines, 1991
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY-MICROECONOaIcs

281, 292

(1991); 1992 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 § 2.1
[hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines] (adopting the "coordinated" terminology). The term "coordinated" is defined infra at note 22.
17
In the repeated game models, also termed "oligopoly super-

games," the game is repeated infinitely or else finitely with an uncertain
termination point. Models in which games are repeated finitely with certain payoffs and certain termination dates are more similar to one-shot
games than to the models discussed here. See generally, D. FUDENBERG &
J. TIROLE, GAmE TnEORY 145-206 (1991).
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tant future, not a one-time outcome. Moreover, in repeated game
settings, firm strategies may be more complex than the simple
choice between cooperation and competition permissible in
Stigler's one-shot game.18 For example, in the coordinated equilibria of repeated games, firms may cooperate for a while, cut
price for a while, then cooperate again. As a result, industry prices
may vary over time in a complex pattern.
Perhaps the most striking result of viewing oligopoly behavior through the lens of repeated games is one of the most basic:
the so-called folk theorem. 19 The folk theorem takes as given
the same oligopoly setting that Stigler studied. In this setting, the
firms can each profit during any period by simultaneously charging a high price, in excess of the competitive price. This price
will be termed the "cartel price." But each firm has a strong
incentive to cheat. It knows that if its rivals charge the cartel
price, while it undercuts them, it will earn even greater profits
than it would garner by going along with the cartel price. The
slight reduction in price will allow the firm to increase the quantity it sells substantially without markedly lowering its per unit
revenues or profits. Moreover, cheating by one seller is very
costly for the rival firms that continue to charge the cartel price.
When one firm cheats, its rivals will do worse by continuing to
charge the cartel price than they would if they instead charge a
20
lower, competitive price.
Stigler studied a single interaction among the firms in this setting. He concluded that every firm will choose the competitive
18 The older oligopoly models that rely on one-shot games remain
possible equilibria of a limiting case of the repeated game models in
which firms interact each period without considering the past or future.
19 The term "folk theorem" is employed because this result was
widely conjectured before it was formally demonstrated. Although there
are multiple folk theorems in game theory, the folk theorem for infinitely
repeated games with observable actions, discussed in the text, is typically
termed "the" folk theorem. For a technical discussion and proof, see
D. FUDENBERG & J. TiROLE, supra note 17, at 152-54.
20 The single period (stage game) oligopoly payoffs in this setting
are those characteristic of a "prisoner's dilemma."
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price. Each firm does so because it recognizes that its rivals have
a strong incentive to cheat, and that cheating by a rival is very
costly to a firm that does not compete. In this articulation of
Stigler's story, the incentives to cheat on a cartel deter cooperation in the first place.
Now suppose that the firms interact as described above
repeatedly, forever, and that they recognize that their interaction
is repeated. The repetition of the game can change the outcome.
A firm that cheats must now trade off the short-run gains from
cheating against the now-larger cost. The cost of cheating is that
the cheater will never receive the cartel price in the future;
burned once, the cheater's rivals will never agree to the cartel
price again. So each firm sees the following choice. It can cheat
one time, then forever compete. Or, it can never cheat, in which
case it will earn the cartel price forever. Unless the firm cares
very little about future profits relative to present profits, it will
prefer the second choice. It will never cheat on the cartel price.
All firms have similar incentives, so each knows that none of its
rivals will cheat on the cartel price. Recognizing that cheating
will not occur, each firm charges the cartel price rather than the
21
competitive price.

Developments in economic theory since the folk theorem have
demonstrated that cooperation continues to emerge in models after relaxing the assumption that once cheating occurs, the firms are never willing
to choose a high price. The newer models permit any post-deviation
behavior, so long as the conduct satisfies certain rationality criteria, such
as: the proposed punishments must be credible; each firm must be willing
to adopt a future strategy (such as charging a low price to punish a deviating rival) not only in prospect, but also when it comes time to implement the strategy; and the firms must be unwilling to renegotiate the
equilibrium outcome once the game is underway. The more recent
models also introduce various types of imperfect information and learning into the games. See generally, e.g., R. GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR
APPLIED ECONONSTS (1992); D. FUDENBERG & J. TiRoLE, supra note 17;
D. KREps, GAME TIEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING (1990); Shapiro, supra
note 11, at 329-414; Jacquemin & Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and
Horizontal Merger, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 416-73
(R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds. 1989).
21
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In this way, converting the standard oligopoly problem from a
one-shot game to a repeated game can change the outcome. An
oligopoly setting that appeared to encourage competition in
Stigler's analysis may in fact permit supracompetitive pricing
in the coordinated equilibrium outcome of a repeated game.2 As
will be emphasized in the discussion of the second antitrust policy
dilemma in section III below, from the perspective of contemporary economic theory, oligopoly has come to look more hospitable
to supracompetitive pricing than it appeared from the Stiglerian
viewpoint.
Stigler's core insights for antitrust policy nevertheless survive
this change in economic perspective. In order to coordinate in
repeated game models, firms must solve the three problems that
Stigler identified: they must determine the terms of their coordinated arrangement, monitor deviation, and credibly threaten to
punish deviation sufficiently in order to deter cheating in the first
instance.2 3 By deepening the economic understanding of coordination, however, the contemporary economic perspective suggests

22 Contemporary economic theory distinguishes coordinated behavior from unilateral behavior. Unilateral behavior arises in repeated games
when firms ignore the past and future, interacting in each period (stage
game) as though it were a one-shot game. Hence any behavior in a oneshot game, whether cooperative or noncooperative, if infinitely repeated,
would be considered unilateral from the perspective of an appropriate
repeated game. Coordinated behavior arises when firms adopt, with or
without discussion or communication with their rivals, strategies that recognize that they have interacted in the past and will continue to do so in
the future. See Willig, supra note 16, at 292-93 & 293 n.26; 1992 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.1 (coordinating firms take actions that
are profitable "only as a result of the accommodating actions of their
rivals").
23 The 1992 Merger Guidelines emphasize the continuity of the modem economic perspective with the insights of Stigler in describing the
conditions facilitating coordination. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note
16, at §2.
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several additional insights of relevance to antitrust policy. Three
of these insights are highlighted below:2A
1. The threat of punishment must be credible in order to deter cheating.
2. Successful coordination will commonly be imperfect and incomplete.
3. When multiple outcomes are possible, as will often be the case in
oligopoly settings, the choice of outcome turns on one of the possibilities becoming "focal."
B. Punishments must be credible
In contemporary economic models of coordination, firms do
not deviate from high price outcomes because they fear the consequences of cheating. Each firm reasons that if it cheats, the shortterm benefit will be outweighed by a longer-term cost. Cheating is
costly because the cheater's rivals do not stand idle once they
have discovered the deviation. They punish the cheater by lowering the price. The rivals might merely return to competing, or they
might engage in stronger punishment.
But the economic models
cheat find it in their interest to
ever arises. 25 It is not obvious
ment can be costly to the firms

insist that the rivals who do not
punish if the time for punishment
that this would be so, as punishundertaking it. For example, forc-

24
A fourth such insight, more relevant to merger analysis than to
identifying horizontal agreements to fix price, is emphasized in section
IV below in connection with the discussion of merger enforcement as a
remedy for the oligopoly problem.
25
In the language of economic theory, this insight-that, no matter
how attractive a future behavior appears today, firms will not be expected
to follow it unless the conduct will be attractive when the time comes
to adopt it-is termed the requirement of "subgame perfection." The
commitments a firm makes in order to make credible the punishments
it threatens in the event a rival cheats cause the equilibrium outcomes
in which firms employ those punishment strategies to be subgame per-

fect. J. TIROLE, THE

THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

D. KRxs, supra note 21, at 69 n.ll.

428-29 (1988);

158 : The antitrust bulletin

ing a cheater to experience a period of below-cost pricing would
often constitute an extremely effective punishment. But if the
market price is forced below cost in order to create such a punishment, the punishing firm will typically experience losses of its
own. No matter how confidently the firm announces its intention
to punish should some other firm cheat, when the time comes to
carry through on that announcement, the firm may decide that preserving the coordinated outcome by engaging in below-cost pricing is more costly to it than its alternative option of
accommodating the deviation by passively allowing the cheating
to continue. Accordingly, if the cheating firm thinks that its rivals
will not carry out a punishment threat, that threat will not deter
the firm from deviating.

-

Firms can deter rivals from cheating by guaranteeing that
when the time comes to carry through a punishment, they will
find the punishment behavior attractive. They do so by tying their
26
own hands, as through making irreversible (sunk) investments.
For example, firms can acquire low cost excess capacity, thereby
insuring that the punishment response of increased output will be
attractive should a rival cheat. Or they might contractually obligate themselves to match any good faith low price offer of a rival,
thereby insuring that they will lower their prices immediately
should some rival cheat. Without some such commitment, a punishment threat more costly to the punishing firm than passively
allowing (accommodating) the cheating will not be credible,
cheating will not be deterred, and a cartel in which the high price
outcome is guaranteed (supported) by that punishment threat
cannot be successful. For this reason, in determining whether
coordination is plausible, economists insist that the threatened
punishments for deviation be credible.

26

For a discussion of these strategies generally, see Salop, Practices

That (Credibly) FacilitateOligopoly Coordinationin New Developments
in the Analysis of Market Structure 265-90 (J. Stiglitz & G.F. Mathewson eds. 1986); Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REv.

335 (Papers & Proceedings 1979).
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This development in economic understanding affects economic intuitions about the likelihood of successful coordination.
The need for punishment to be credible confirms Stigler's emphasis on the difficulties involved in cooperation. The firms must
punish cheating in order to deter deviation, but some potential
punishment strategies will not suffice because such strategies
must be credible. This insight into the difficulty of insuring cartel
policing adds support to the Stiglerian view that coordination is
not inevitable in oligopolies.
Yet the mere return to competition may constitute enough punishment to deter firms from cheating on some coordinated outcomes.2 7 In contrast to the threat of below-cost pricing, under
which the firm engaging in punishment will suffer losses, the
threat of returning to competition will frequently be a credible
one. 28 Hence, in the many industries in which some type of coordination can be maintained by the meie threat of the return to
competition, the problem of cartel policing may not be fatal
to reaching some coordinated outcome. Because coordination
need not be perfect to be successful, as discussed below, the postStiglerian requirement that punishments be credible refines
E.g., Ross, Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation, 10 IN'L
J.INDus. ORG. 1 (1992) (the threat of a return to competition may credibly support coordination in a differentiated product setting). This point
is recognized in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 16, at §2.12
("[c]redible punishment. . . may not need to be any more complex than
temporary abandonment of the terms of coordination by other firms in the
market").
28 Even though a return to competition does not cause the punishing
firm to incur short-run losses, this strategy will not be credible unless it is
more profitable for firms than the alternative strategy of passively allowing the cheating firm to deviate. When the cheating firm would expand
output quickly, take a great deal of business from its rivals, and cause the
market price to fall significantly, passive accommodation is unlikely to
be more profitable than a return to competition. Cf. Gelman & Salop,
Judo Economics: CapacityLimitations and Coupon Competition, 14 BELL
J. ECON. 315 (1983) (entrants, and by implication cheaters, can induce
accommodation by their colluding rivals by committing to a strategy of
limited entry).
27
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the economic understanding of what coordination requires without
reducing the contemporary concern with the behavior of
oligopolies.
C. Coordinationmay be imperfect and incomplete

The second insight arising from the shift in perspective from
one-shot to repeated games is that coordination need not be perfect or complete in order to cause price to rise above the competitive level. As the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize,
the terms of coordination may, for example, "omit some market
participants, omit some dimensions of competition, omit some
customers, yield elevated prices short of monopoly levels, or
lapse into episodic price wars

competitive harm." 29

. . .

and still result in significant

In some sense, economists have never believed otherwise. The
dominant view among economists writing in the pre-Stiglerian
tradition, emphasizing the dangers of interdependent oligopoly
behavior, was that most oligopolies engaged in behavior ranging
between perfect cooperation and competition.30 Similarly, one
leading Chicago school commentator, who took from Stigler the
lessen that "oligopolists cannot be presumed always or often to
charge supracompetitive prices," also "speculat[ed]" that Stigler's
approach was not necessarily inconsistent with tacit coordination
in some highly concentrated oligopolies "even if collusion was
imperfect and the average price substantially below the joint
maximizing price." 31 Nevertheless, economists writing in the
wake of Stigler's article often accepted three generalizations: that
mere interdependent behavior leads to little welfare loss without
cooperation, that cooperation itself is unlikely because of the
problems of reaching and policing agreements, but that should
firms find a way to cooperate, the harm to competition would

30

1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.11.
E.g., J. BAIN, supra note 11, at 306-16.

31

Posner, supra note 7, at 1574.

29
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likely be substantial.3 2 Consequently, when the Justice Department became heavily influenced by Stigler, the agency placed a
high priority on investigating and prosecuting criminal price-fixing conspiracies, 33 and yet simultaneously was thought by comwould
mentators to have exhibited a relaxed concern that mergers
34
harm competition by making cooperation more likely.
The Stiglerian perspective suggests a picture of the world in
which firms are typically competing (or have achieved some other
noncooperative oligopoly outcome). In such a world, the main
concern of courts and enforcers would be that a structural change
such as a merger or the introduction of a facilitating practice
might tip the outcome (equilibrium) from competition to cooperation by altering every firm's dominant strategy. In contrast, the
post-Stiglerian focus of economic theory on the requirement that
punishments be credible suggests a different picture of the world,
one in which coordination is typically incomplete or less than
fully successful.
Economists now understand that the degree to which coordination can be successful depends upon the severity of the punishments the firms expect. The more successful cooperation
becomes, the more the cooperating firms can benefit from cheating and the greater their incentive to do so. Hence, the more
severe the punishment for cheating, the more successful cooperation can be. For example, the punishment of merely reverting to
competition, which may often be a credible punishment, may
32
E.g., Bork, Antitrust and the Theory of ConcentratedMarkets,
in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 81-89
(E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1979); Y. BROZEN, supra note 12, at 181
(tacit collusion unlikely).
33 Rule, 60 Minutes with the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 257, 258 (1988).

E.g., Briggs, An Overview of Current Law and Policy Relating to
34
Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 657, 665, 670, 703 (1987);
cf. 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 387 (1989) (denying the

charge that merger standards were relaxed).
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frequently be sufficient to deter cheating if price rises somewhat
above the competitive level, but not be sufficiently severe to deter
cheating if price rises to the monopoly level. Yet the tougher punishments necessary to make coordination perfect or complete may
not be credible; they may simply cost too much to those firms
engaged in punishing their rivals.
From this contemporary perspective, incomplete and imperfect
35
coordination is a plausible outcome in an oligopoly setting
Although the repeated game models preserve the Stiglerian insight
that coordination is not inevitable, in the sense that the structural
conditions making coordination irrational can be identified, the
focus on incomplete and imperfect coordination creates a picture
of the world more hospitable to coordination than has been suggested by those commentators most heavily influenced by Stigler.
D. Focal rules may provide the terms of
a coordinatedunderstanding
The third contemporary insight about oligopoly behavior arising from the perspective of the theory of repeated games is that
many equilibrium outcomes are typically possible, 36 and the
choice of outcome turns on one of the possibilities standing out as
self-evident. In the language of oligopoly theory, an outcome that
stands out as self-evident is termed "focal." 37
35 See, e.g., Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 191 (1986); Green & Porter, Noncooperative
Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87
(1984).
36
D. KREPs, supra note 21, at 97.
37

Thomas Schelling, who invented the idea of focal points, recog-

nized the idea's application to oligopoly coordination. T. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CoNFIucT 74 (1960) (oligopoly behavior is likely explained
by "tacit communication and its dependence on qualitatively identifiable
and fairly unambiguous signals that can be read in the situation itself").
In this article, the term "focal" is used in the general sense of a selfevident way to play the game, or a way of making one equilibrium stand
out from among the many possibilities. See J. TIROLE, supra note 25, at
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It is often easy for one outcome to stand out as self-evident,
and, in consequence, for it to be selected as the equilibrium outcome. For example, one firm could announce its choice among
possible outcomes at a press conference by saying "we intend to
raise all prices by five percent next month." Such "cheap talk"
(costless communication in the language of contemporary economic theory) may be all that is necessary for the industry members to identify one of the possibilities as the focal outcome, and,
in consequence, for all to select it as the self-evident way to
behave. 38 To the extent it is easy to identify some terms of coordination in this way, the contemporary perspective suggests that it is
typically the difficulties of policing a coordinated understanding
(monitoring or punishing cheaters) rather than the difficulties of
reaching the terms of that arrangement that potentially inhibits the
39
possibility of coordination in most oligopolies.

247. The term "focal" encompasses strategies that become self-evident
because of negotiation, direct experience with the game, social convention, an obvious sense of correct play, and deduction and prospection.
See D. KREPs, supra note 21, at 139-44; D. KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY

410-17 (1990). Some economic theorists employ

"refinements" of the equilibrium concept to isolate specific outcomes
when multiple equilibria are possible. This analytic strategy identifies a
way to play as self-evident through deduction from an arbitrary assumption of a higher degree of generality. See generally, D. KREPS, A COURSE
IN MICROECONoNIc THEORY

at 417-43. The resulting equilibria may be

more focal to economic theorists than to the firms involved, however. See
D. KREPs, supra note 21, at 108 (expressing "skepticism" about the application of refinements); cf. K. BINMORE, FUN AND GAMES: A TEXT ON GAME
THEORY 295 n.16, 544-45 (1992) (describing the subject of employing
refinements as a basis for equilibrium selection as "controversial").
38
D. KiRaps, supra note 37, at 388-89, 411; see, e.g., Farrell, Cheap
Talk, Coordination, and Entry, 18 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1987); cf.
M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY

106 (1980) (advocating that oligop-

olists seek to establish an advantageous focal point through cheap talk).
39 The possibility of coordination is distinguished from the extent of
coordination. If the policing problem is solved by the firms, coordination
may still be imperfect and incomplete (as is likely when focal rules
supply the terms of agreement).
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It might appear implausible that any particular outcome other
than the competitive one could be identified with little or no interfirm communication in a complex industry setting, in which firms
differ in costs and products, nonprice competition is extensive,
and buyers differ in preferences. 40 The problem of identifying
terms of a coordinated understanding is actually simpler than it
initially appears, however, because preexisting practices can often
be taken as self-evident and, accordingly, can be grandfathered by
the firms. This point may be clarified by distinguishing between
focal rules and focal points.
In the typical oligopoly setting, many simply stated rules will
each identify a set of related outcomes, with every outcome in
such a set more preferred by all firms than competition. As the
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize, "[f]irms coordinating their interactions need not reach complex terms concerning
the allocation of the market output across firms or the level of the
market prices but may, instead, follow simple terms such as a
common price, fixed price differentials, stable market shares, or
customer or territorial restrictions." 4 1 Such a rule freezes most
preexisting firm practices. Once a focal rule of this sort is identified-for example, "preserve existing price differentials" or "preserve existing market shares"-identifying a focal point (a
specific equilibrium outcome) turns merely on choosing a single
parameter-such as the common percentage price increase or
E.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15.
41
1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.11. Coordinating
firms must agree on the terms of punishment as well as the terms of the
high price outcome (the reward state). The focal rule for punishment
might take the same form as the focal rule for the reward state. For example, firms might lower all prices by a common percentage should punishment be necessary, or raise output by a common percentage in order to
preserve market shares. One punishment rule that is likely always to be
potentially focal is a return to the competitive price and output (for some
significant period of time). This punishment rule is also attractive
because more severe punishments (such as below-cost pricing) may not
be credible and because some more severe punishments may be prohibited by antitrust's bar on predatory conduct. For these reasons, most
40

Section I dilemmas : 165
common percentage output reduction. 42 In many industries, a particular focal rule will stand out as self-evident based on, for
example, the information that firms routinely collect about their
rivals. In general, focal rules can be expected to be simply stated
and readily grasped. Outcomes consistent with the focal rule-the
feasible set of coordinated outcomes-may fail to garner for the
oligopolists much of the profit available from joint profit maximization (express collusion), but this is no bar to successful coor43
dination because coordination need not be perfect or complete.
The following hypothetical case suggests the way focal rules
make it easy for oligopolists to reach the terms of a coordinated
understanding. Consider a manufacturing industry in which each
firm sells a number of products to retailers for later resale to consumers. Each firm might, for example, sell electrical equipment to
hardware stores or candy to drug stores. The firms sell a number
of products in the category (types of candy or electrical equipment) in multiple sizes and styles. Suppose that each firm in the
industry publishes a price book, listing the prices it charges for all
its products. Assume away the possibility that a manufacturer
would be able to give a retailer a secret discount,"4 and assume
examples in the text implicitly assume that the oligopoly will punish
deviation merely by returning to competition.
42
The focal rules discussed in the text reduce the complexity of
identifying terms of coordination to the choice of a single parameter. The
argument would not be changed significantly if the focal rule were to
reduce the coordination problem to the choice of a small number of
parameters rather than a single parameter.
43 More technically, the feasible set of coordinated equilibria are
those that are consistent with a plausible focal rule. This set need not
contain the joint profit-maximizing equilibrium.
44 This assumption is made so that the example highlights the possibility of multiple equilibria and the significance of focal rules. Whether
firms can quickly and reliably monitor the output and price decisions of
their rivals is typically an empirical question. Hence, if a court is examining an actual industry of the sort being described, the ability of sellers to
discount in secret may be an important issue in determining whether
coordination is plausible. The ability of manufacturers to discount
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further that the prices set by any one manufacturer are immediately met by its rivals. Accordingly, excepting brief periods of
transition, all price books are identical. These assumptions also
imply that each firm can quickly and reliably monitor the prices
and sales of its rivals, and that deviations would be punished
immediately (as each firm lowers price to meet the price charged
by the cheater).
These assumptions create an economic environment conducive
to coordination. Rapid detection and response to deviation make
cheating unlikely. Accordingly, any set of high prices simultaneously adopted by the firms will constitute an equilibrium outcome. Moreover, many such outcomes are possible; this industry
presents a setting in which multiple equilibria are likely. The
firms would accept many sets of prices (many price books) in
preference to competition, should any of those price books be
adopted by all, although at any instant only one set of prices is in
fact the industry standard.
In this setting, coordination can be made more effective by
making some other, higher set of prices focal. Complex changes
in the price structure may be difficult to communicate, but it is
easy to imagine one firm making a common percentage price
increase focal by announcing that it has raised all prices in its previous price book by, say, five percent. All firms will recognize
that if every rival follows immediately, the price increase will
stick, but that if some rival does not follow, those that initially
adopt the increase will return to the lower price. Moreover, within
a large range of price changes, each firm will recognize that it is
in its interest to match immediately. 45 It is evident that multiple
secretly may be limited, for example, by the frequency of visits by manufacturers' sales representatives, the ability of those sales representatives
to observe the shelf space and retail pricing of the products of rival manufacturers, and the existence of explicit or implicit "price protection"
provisions (such as most favored nations or meeting competition clauses)
in the supply agreements between manufacturers and retailers.
45 At some point, however, the announced price increase will generate a price so high as to shrink profits by shrinking demand, or so high as
to make cheating more attractive to some firm than the alternative of
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outcomes are possible under these circumstances: the firms might
equally raise all prices by four percent or six percent, or lower
them by two percent.
In this example, the industry practice of adopting a price book
establishes the focal rule of preserving existing price differentials.
The choice of outcome within the set made feasible by this rule is
reduced to the identification of a single, specific, common percentage price increase as a focal point. Despite the complexity of
the industry setting, reaching the terms of coordination involves
no more than the simple tasks of identifying first a focal rule, and
then a focal point contingent on that rule.
The example can be used to illustrate the difference between
coordination that is feasible without complex communication and
what the firms would choose to do could they bargain to reach the
joint profit-maximizing outcome. Some firms might prefer a
higher common price increase than five percent and other firms
might prefer less. For example, if the industry output reduction
arising from a common increase in price falls largely on one particular firm, perhaps because products are differentiated and those
buyers preferring its product are the most likely to do without in
response to a small price rise, then that firm may prefer less of a
price rise than does its rivals. Moreover, more complex patterns of
price changes, such as raising price six percent on some products
and three percent on others, might be more profitable for some or
all of the firms than a common increase of five percent. Were the
firms able to cooperate legally, they might in consequence bargain
to a negotiated set of prices far different from preserving the existing
46
price book differentials and raising all prices by five percent.
These possibilities are not feasible, however, where antitrust law's
cooperation. Under such circumstances, one or more firms will balk at
the price increase. As discussed in section IV below, mergers may
enhance coordination may raising the lowest price at which a firm would
prefer deviation to cooperation.
46
An express cartel would likely increase the market share of firms
able to sell at the highest margin (e.g., because of low production costs),
and compensate through side payments those rivals whose share would in
consequence decline.
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prohibition of express and tacit agreements limits the terms of
coordination to focal rules that are simply stated, thereby reducing
the problem of identifying terms of coordination from a complex
task to the choice of a single parameter. 47
Even though the feasible set of coordination possibilities
employing focal rules is smaller than the coordination possibilities available through express agreement, many feasible focal
point outcomes are likely to be more profitable than competition
for every firm in an oligopoly. And it is likely that the firms in an
oligopoly will find a way to identify one such outcome.48 Under
such circumstances, the difficulties of identifying terms of the

47 Bid-rigging may be easier to arrange than most other forms of
express collusion because procurement specifications typically limit the
dimensions of competition to one variable, price. Focal rules accomplish
the same result of facilitating coordination by limiting the dimensions of
competition to a small number of variables.
48
It is possible, though unlikely, that the firms will be unable to
select among the multiple equilibria. As the 1992 Merger Guidelines recognize, if firms have "substantially incomplete information about the
conditions and prospects of their rivals' businesses, perhaps because of
important differences among their current business operations," they may
find it difficult to bargain to a common understanding. 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.11. Firms with a great deal of
private information will have an incentive to take an extreme bargaining
position and stick with it rather than compromise, knowing that their
rivals cannot call their bluff. Under such circumstances, negotiations may
break down altogether. If this bargaining problem would have affected
express negotiations among the firms, had such negotiations taken place,
it might also lead the firms to refuse to accept an equilibrium outcome
that a rival is attempting to make focal. It is unlikely, however, that many
industries will be unable to reach a coordinated understanding because of
this problem. But cf. J. TiROLE, supra note 25, at 242, 250-51 (cost asymmetries may make it difficult for firms to identify a focal equilibrium);
supra at note 8 & infra at note 117 (frequent, significant, and imminent
entry, expansion, or innovation may impede reaching a coordinated
understanding when the new competitor would prefer the competitive
outcome to its profit under any focal coordination rule; such a firm may
be so powerful a maverick as to inhibit coordination altogether).
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coordinated agreement will not impede coordination. 49 Coordination is not inevitable because, as Stigler emphasized, successful
oligopolists must also be able to monitor and punish deviation.
But the contemporary economic insight that focal rules may provide the terms of agreement undercuts the significance of the concern that it may be difficult for oligopolists to negotiate the terms
of their coordinated understanding.
II. The first dilemma: proving an agreement to fix price
from circumstantial evidence
These developments in economics can be expected increasingly to lead a court considering whether to infer an agreement to
fix price under Sherman Act § 1 from parallel pricing and other
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy to recognize a logical
dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma is rooted in Stigler's
insight that market structure affects the ability of firms to coordinate. If the economic environment in the industry in which parallel pricing is observed is not conducive to coordination, for
example, because cheating is difficult to detect or punish, then
it would be irrational for the firms to reach an agreement. If it
would be irrational to agree, an agreement is unlikely to have
been reached.
The second horn of the dilemma emerges from contemporary
economic theory. If the economic environment is conducive to
49 Shifts in cost, demand, or market structure may induce the coordinating firms to renegotiate the terms of their arrangement by establishing
a new focal outcome. Renegotiations of the coordinated understanding
can be expected to occur often when such shocks are large and frequent,
and when a new focal equilibrium can be established cheaply. See supra
at note 38 and accompanying text (cheap talk facilitates the establishment
of a focal equilibrium), supra at note 42 and accompanying text (renegotiation of a focal point may be facilitiated by preserving the focal rule),
supra at note 48 (private information may impede renegotiation); cf.
Slade, Cheating on Collusive Agreements, 8 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 519
(1990) (unexpectedly high or low costs may induce deviation from a
coordinated understanding).
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coordination, then the firms may establish focal rules for achieving high prices through coordination without engaging in the
process that the law terms an agreement. Reaching an agreement
may confer little additional market power upon the firms, and it
will raise the risks of a costly antitrust prosecution. If an agreement is unnecessary for firms to achieve the observed coordinated
outcome, then it would be irrational for the firms to agree; under
such circumstances, parallel pricing will be understood as arising
more plausibly from independent decision making under conditions of oligopolistic interdependence than from an agreement to
fix price. Although the second horn of this dilemma does not
apply unless industry behavior could be consistent with what
would result were a coordinated understanding based on a plausible focal rule, the two horns of this dilemma can be expected to
lead courts often to question whether it would be rational for the
firms to agree. A court that experiences such doubts will be reluctant to infer an agreement to fix price under Sherman Act § 1 from
circumstantial evidence.
The argument of the first dilemma did not arise in the era
before Stigler's pathbreaking analysis of oligopoly. The traditional legal approach to identifying an agreement from circumstantial evidence, established in mid-century, focused on detecting
indicia of a secret conspiracy rather than on analyzing whether the
economic environment was conducive to coordination. Stigler's
picture of oligopoly, in conjunction with the increasing judicial
focus on the economic rationality of alleged conspiracies, led
antitrust to incorporate factors related to the economic plausibility
of an agreement into the analytic methodology for identifying a
§ 1 conspiracy, thereby allowing courts to recognize the first horn
of the dilemma. If contemporary developments in economics have
a similar power, the second horn of the dilemma will begin to
flower judicially. With both horns of the dilemma in place, courts
will become significantly more reluctant to infer a horizontal
agreement to fix price under Sherman Act § 1 from circumstantial
evidence than were their predecessors at mid-century.
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A. Traditionallegal doctrine, mere oligopolistic interdependence,
and consciousparallelism

The idea of an agreement among competitors was clarified in
a debate around the middle of the 20th century over whether a § 1
agreement could be inferred from the simultaneous increase in
prices by the handful of rivals in an oligopoly-that is, from conduct termed "conscious parallelism." The debate was framed
around answering a simple question: With nothing more in the
evidentiary record than parallel price increases and an oligopoly
setting, should a § 1 agreement to restrain prices be inferred?
During the era in which the structural school dominated
antitrust commentary, the primary argument for inferring a horizontal agreement on price from evidence limited to parallel price
increases among firms recognizing their interdependence was that
oligopolistic interdependence was thought likely to lead to high
prices similar to those that would be charged had the firms
created a "trust" (cartel) of the sort that existed before § 1 was
enacted. If express collusion is unlawful, it would seem that parallel pricing in an oligopoly, a practice resulting in a similar harm,
should also be deemed to violate Sherman Act § 1.
This argument for deeming parallel pricing among oligopolists
a violation of § 1 was ultimately rejected by the antitrust mainstream, for the reasons set forth in Donald Turner's influential
1962 article on conscious parallelism.50 The key economic insight
underlying the reluctance to reach conscious parallelism under the
Sherman Act was the recognition that parallel pricing is typically
unavoidable in an oligopoly. Whether they are competing or cooperating, oligopolists will be led to charge the identical price.51
50 Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655

(1962). These issues had been debated prior to Turner's article. E.g., THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
REPORT 36-42, 327, 331-32 (S. Barnes & C. Oppenheim eds. 1955).

51

If firm products differ in quality, prices will be led to be identical

after adjusting for the differences in quality perceived by the marginal
buyer. Under such circumstances, parallel pricing will take the form of
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Any firm charging a price higher than that of its rivals (for longer
than a brief period) will be forced to reduce that price because it
will lose too many sales. Any firm charging a price lower than
that of its rivals will find that its rivals will rapidly lower price to
match. Accordingly, all firms will be led to change price simultaneously and identically, regardless of whether the price changes
have an innocent explanation (e.g., a response to variation in
industry demand or costs) or whether prices rise as a result of a
cooperative effort to exercise market power.
Because conscious parallelism is unavoidable in an oligopoly,
a court that found an agreement among competitors to fix price
solely from evidence of a parallel increase in price in a concentrated industry would find it difficult to frame satisfactory relief.5 2
An injunction barring conscious parallelism is problematic
because a court would have nothing to enjoin; it is not practical to
forbid conduct that is unavoidable. Nor would it be practical for a
judge to issue an injunction barring above-cost pricing. Cost is
difficult to determine, 53 and a court will properly be reluctant to
simultaneous changes in price that preserve a constant differential. See
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,222 (1940).
52 Richard Posner terms this the "decisive" objection raised by
Turner. Posner, supra note 7, at 1564.
53 Accounting measures of cost often differ significantly from the
underlying economic concept, in ways difficult to unravel, because of the
accounting allocation of costs across products and over time (depreciation). For example, it is often difficult to distinguish from accounting
data rents from investments in advertising or new product design from
economic profits. For this reason, academic economists attempting to
identify market power empirically increasingly treat cost as unobservable. See Bresnahan, EmpiricalStudies of Industries with Market Power,
in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011-57 (R. Schmalensee &
R. Willig eds. 1989). Courts similarly find it challenging to determine
cost from accounting data when evaluating claims predicated upon
below-cost pricing. See ABA ANrImusT SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTs 227-34 (3d ed. 1992). Moreover, a cost-based standard for
prices would be difficult to apply because the appropriate measure of cost
to be compared with price is not always obvious. Price would equal
marginal cost in the competitive (free entry) equilibrium, unless marginal
cost pricing would produce insufficient contribution to profit to cover a
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enjoin prices in excess of costs for fear that it will be forced into
ongoing regulatory supervision of the defendants.
If antitrust law were to permit a court to deem mere parallel
pricing in an oligopoly setting to violate § 1, moreover, that result
would blur the existing line between unilateral and concerted
behavior. Indeed, if conscious parallelism is frequently unavoidable among oligopolists in concentrated industries, it is hard to
see how an oligopolist acting innocently, with no intent to agree,
could avoid being held liable. A criminal prosecution for a horizontal restraint on price under such circumstances would appear
to conflict with the criminal law's requirement of mens rea.5 5 For
all these reasons, antitrust law does not permit the inference of a
horizontal agreement to fix price from evidence limited to parallel
pricing in a concentrated industry. 56 In the words of the Supreme
normal economic return on capital. The latter situation may arise when
fixed costs are large or marginal cost decreases with output. Then the
competitive price would equal an entrant's marginal cost (which might
often be approximated by incumbent average cost).
m Whenever costs increase, defendants can be expected to petition
for modification of the relief to allow higher prices. And whenever costs
decrease, customers will seek modification to require lower prices.
55 The state of mind required for criminal culpability may be demonstrated even if defendant had no desire to conspire, but merely an intention to match the price charged by its rivals, through proof that defendant
knew that the consequences of raising price would be to violate the law.
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443-46
(1978). Thus, if conscious parallelism is deemed an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act, the requisite mental state could arguably be
inferred from the parallel behavior even in the absence of specific intent
to agree.
m As these overwhelming difficulties of using Sherman Act § 1 to
address the oligopoly problem became clear, other approaches to that end
were debated. In other writings, Turner proposed interpreting the monopolization prohibitions of Sherman Act § 2 to reach beyond monopolies to
oligopolies, and he proposed dissolving large firms in concentrated
industries (regardless of whether the oligopolists were actually cooperating). Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory
Policies, 82 HARv. L. RFv. 1207, 1231 (1969); C. KAYSEN & D. TuR NR,
ANTIrRUST Poticy 110-19, 266-72 (1959). Critics charged that these poli-

174 : The antitrust bulletin

Court, "'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of
57
the Sherman Act entirely."
The courts responded to the objections to inferring a horizontal agreement solely from evidence of parallel pricing by creating
the legal rule of "parallelism plus," under which circumstantial
evidence of a horizontal agreement remains tested today. 58 Under
this rule, an agreement to fix price cannot be inferred from paral-

cies would penalize firms for exploiting scale economies in production
and that they would encourage large firms to charge very high prices in
order to limit their own market share by preserving high-cost fringe suppliers in the marketplace. For these reasons, antitrust never broadened the
scope of §2 to apply to oligopolies, but cf. United States v. American
Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984) (attempted monopolization
found when one firm expressly solicited a price increase from its only
rival), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985), and "no-fault" demonopolization legislation was never enacted, Kovacic, FailedExpectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for
Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REV. 1105, 1126-27 (1989). The debate
over these proposals ended when the Chicago approach became
antitrust's mainstream. Turner also attempted to impede the creation of
oligopolistic market structures through strict antitrust review of mergers,
as reflected in the Justice Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines, which
were promulgated while Turner was the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust.
5
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 541 (1954).

U 6 P. AREEDA, ANTIrrRUST LAW 1434a (1986). Absent evidence
beyond parallel pricing, as would be provided by "plus factors," a fact
finder cannot reject the view that firms have acted unilaterally in favor of
the view that the firms have cooperated, even in settings where the firms
are sufficiently few as to recognize their interdependence. Indeed, a court
cannot consider whether an agreement exists from evidence of parallel
pricing alone, because that evidence does not make the inference of price
fixing more plausible than the inference of (legal) independent decision
making. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
Accordingly, evidence of parallel conduct without plus factors is insufficient as a matter of law to meet the civil burden of proof for finding a
conspiracy.
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lel pricing in the absence of other circumstantial evidence, the socalled plus factors.5 9
The plus factors that have been the most prominently relied
upon by courts reflect the central concern of the leading Supreme
Court decisions from mid-century on inferring an agreement from
circumstantial evidence: 60 to discover and uproot trusts pushed
underground by the Sherman Act. 6' When these plus factors are
59 The fact finder's task in identifying an agreement requires more
than counting the number of plus factors on some checklist; the evidence
bearing on the inference of conspiracy is taken as a whole. Moreover, the
acts giving rise to the inference of an agreement (the plus factors) may in
themselves be wholly innocent. American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
60 The leading cases include Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. Socony7Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537 (1954); see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946) (Sherman § 2 conspiracy). Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 7, at
24-26 (arguing that in 1940, the Supreme Court established a rule of law
that focused solely on evidence of conspiracy, ignoring evidence of the
economic effect of the challenged conduct). The goal of uprooting secret
conspiracies also affected the formulation of antitrust's per se rule
against horizontal price fixing. If a hidden agreement could be identified,
liability followed without an inquiry into the economic effect of the
agreement or the reasonableness of the prices charged. Why, after all,
would the parties reach a secret agreement unless they were up to no
good? See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224
n.59 (1940). This per se rule has partially eroded since 1979, as indicated
supra at note 2. Historically, a second line of Sherman Act § 1 decisions
examined whether openly acknowledged agreements were reasonable.
E.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
61 Prosecutors and courts legitimately feared that secret conspiracies
were commonplace in big business, especially after the shocking revelation in 1960 that executives of General Electric and Westinghouse had
participated in a criminal price-fixing conspiracy involving electrical
equipment. E.g., J. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY
OF PRICE FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDusTaY 218 (1962) (price fixing is
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observed in conjunction with parallel pricing, they suggest a
secret agreement on price. They include: 62
a. proof that the rivals had the opportunity for direct communication, 63 or that they in fact communicated directly; 64
b. evidence of anticompetitive intent behind the parallel conduct;6
"simple and easy to do; extremely difficult to detect and prove"); J. HERLING,

TIONS

THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST VIOLAIN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 304 (1962) (the indictment "revealed

the hitherto secret premises of economic decision for a significant section
of the economy"). While it is possible that the focus on hidden cartel
agreements was encouraged by the Cold War fear of secret conspiracies
at home and abroad, the continuing active criminal price-fixing enforcement program of the Justice Department suggests that attention to price
fixing cannot be dismissed as an anachronism.
62
Other plus factors, related to the plausibility of an agreement in
the economic environment of the industry at issue rather than to the
desire to uproot a hidden cartel, are discussed infra at notes 77-79 and
accompanying text.
63
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400-01
(4th Cir. 1958) (agreement inferred when simultaneous price increase follows meeting among competitors at which higher prices were discussed),
aff d on other grounds, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
64
Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 255 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557
F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v.
Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043
(1980); see Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939)
(agreement found when the proposed course of conduct was communicated to rivals as well as customers, then adopted by the industry with
minor modifications). The secrecy of discussions among competitors
(e.g., secret meetings) may count in favor of finding an agreement when
it suggests guilty knowledge on the part of the conspirators. 6 P. AREEDA,
supra note 58, at 1417d. Moreover, personal meetings of conspirators
are more dangerous to competition than information exchanged publicly
(e.g., through the press) to the extent meetings permit more complex
exchanges of information. See id. at 1435b (private meetings), 1435c
(public communication).
65 E.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2274 (1991).
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c. behavior difficult to imagine as arising in the absence of detailed
communication, because it appears arbitrary or unusually complex;6 or
d. behavior difficult to understand as rational in the absence of an
agreement, 67 including the absence of a legitimate justification
for the practice.6
6
The theory of conscious parallelism has been said to justify a finding of conspiracy when the parallelism is of an "elaborate and complex
nature" along with "a web of circumstantial evidence pointing very convincingly to the ultimate fact of agreement." Delaware Valley Marine
Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 206 n.19 (3d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). Compare In re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d
432, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding agreement when posted information
was "unusually detailed"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991) with
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (no agreement found when the only information announced was the prime lending
rate).

67 Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 223 (It "taxes credulity" to imagine
that the conduct would have occurred absent "some understanding that all
were to join"); American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 805 (prices rose when
costs declined); Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573, 578
(10th Cir. 1956) (upholding price-fixing conviction when conspirator
who cut off discounting distributor from access to low-priced product for
resale was "acting against its economic interest"). The idea of actions not
rational but for an agreement raises troublesome analytic difficulties in
application, see Yao & DeSanti, supra note 7, at text accompanying notes
39-47, that are closely related to the problems of applying the definition
of an agreement, discussed infra at notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
6
E.g., Ambook Enters. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 615 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980). While the presence of a
legitimate business justification-also termed an efficiency explanation
in the contemporary economic language of antitrust-need not defeat the
inference of an agreement from other evidence, a weak, pretextual, or
nonexistent justification encourages such an inference. (The presence of a
business justification for firm behavior also enters into the Sherman § 1
analysis in two ways beyond its role as a factor relevant to determining
whether the behavior constitutes an agreement: as a factor relevant to
determining whether an agreement should be characterized as illegal per
se, and as a factor relevant to determining whether an agreement is
unreasonable if the behavior is analyzed under the rule of reason.)
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In this way, antitrust law employed plus factors to operationalize the legal concept of an agreement. This strategy for determining whether to infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence
was more attractive than the alternative of applying to the facts of
each case a definition of the term "agreement," because the most
common definitions would appear to require a court to infer a horizontal conspiracy from mere parallel pricing. For example, if an
agreement is defined as a meeting of the minds, 69 a court
conscientiously applying the definition would likely infer
an agreement from the consciously parallel interaction among
oligopolists. 70 When firm 1 raises price, expecting firm 2 to do
the same, and firm 2 rises price expecting firm 1 to likewise, the
firms have reached a common understanding by communicating
71
solely through their pricing actions.
69
A § 1 agreement is said to mean a "common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement," American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946), "mutual consent," Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007-08 (9th Cir.
1965), or "a conscious commitment to a common scheme," Monsanto v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
70
Posner, supra note 7, at 1576.
71
The following objection might be offered to the above application
of the definition of an agreement. Consider two firms that price competitively, at cost. If firm 1 observes its costs have increased, and if it recognizes that firm 2's costs have increased, then firm 1 will raise price by
the amount of the cost increase in the expectation that firm 2 will be
forced to do likewise. Similarly, firm 2 will raise price expecting firm 1
to go along. By the meeting of the minds definition, this conduct would
seem to constitute an agreement. Yet antitrust law should not reach this
conduct, because the behavior is competitive: the firms price at cost, and
prices merely respond to shifts in cost. As a general critique of the use of
the definition for identifying an agreement, this objection is unsatisfactory, however, because a meeting of the minds is unnecessary for competitive firms to find it rational to change prices when costs change.
Firms pricing at marginal cost will be forced to raise price when their
costs increase regardless of what their rivals do. This rejoinder in effect
exempts one set of prices, those based on cost, from the set of oligopoly
equilibrium outcomes from which a meeting of the minds would be
found.
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By operationalizing the idea of an agreement, antitrust law
clarified that the idea of an agreement describes a process that
firms engage in, not merely the outcome that they reach. 72 Not
every parallel pricing outcome constitutes an agreement because
not every such outcome was reached through the process to which
the law objects: a negotiation that concludes when the firms convey mutual assurances that the understanding they reached will be
carried out. 73 The plus factors suggestive of a secret agreement
permit the inference that the parallel pricing resulted from firms
interacting in the forbidden manner. By raising the costs of reaching complex bargains, antitrust law hopes to reduce the prevalence
74
of such bargains.
The distinction between process and outcome implicit in antitrust
law's preference for identifying agreements through plus factors rather
than by applying a definition of an agreement has no strong parallel in
contract law, because, unlike antitrust litigation, contract litigation rarely
if ever involves an attempt by prosecutors or third-party victims to
demonstrate an agreement denied by the parties alleged to have reached
it. Nevertheless, contract law incorporates doctrines that can be interpreted as insisting that the parties engage in negotiations and convey
mutual assurances before an agreement will be found. For example, when
contract law refuses to find a contract in cases of mutual or unilateral
mistake, it recognizes that identifying a contract involves more than a
determination that the parties have settled on a specific text (outcome);
finding an agreement also turns on a determination that the process of
reaching that outcome is consistent with that process which contract law
contemplates.
72

73 See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at 1404 (an agreement involves
"collective decision-making plus mutual assurance of compliance,"
although, as an evidentiary matter, "either element alone may suffice to
establish an antitrust agreement"), 1410c (unlawful agreement distinguished from lawful interdependence by "some level of commitment to a
common course of action"). Although mere assurances are unlikely to be
credible commitments to carrying out the collective understanding, cf.
text supra, at notes 25-26 (punishment threats are empty unless accompanied by commitments), they may nevertheless facilitate coordination
by helping firms establish an equilibrium outcome as focal.
74 Economics has only one theory of the way firms reach equilibria:
if there is only one equilibrium, firms go there, and if there are multiple
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The traditional antitrust analysis of an agreement that matured
in the middle of the 20th century was well suited to the detection
of secret horizontal conspiracies among oligopolists. With evidence of parallel pricing augmented by indicia that the firms had
negotiated an understanding and provided each other with mutual
assurances that their deal would be carried out, a court was permitted to infer that a horizontal agreement had been reached. The
legal doctrine of parallelism plus encouraged judicial vigilance
against the threat of hidden agreements among oligopolists.
Courts had broad scope to infer agreements from circumstantial
evidence, excepting when the evidence consisted solely of parallel
pricing. The logical dilemma that is the subject of this section had
not begun to flower.
B. The influence of Stigler'spicture of oligopoly
As antitrust began to recognize the significance of Stigler's
economic insights for understanding the interaction among
oligopolists, the logic of the first horn of the first dilemma began
to emerge. Stigler provided a theory by which courts could distinguish industries in which cooperation is plausible from industries
not susceptible to cooperation. As the courts grew to recognize
this possibility, they began to employ additional plus factors in
§ 1 analysis to guarantee that the industry environment at issue is
fertile ground for cooperation.75 These economic plausibility plus
76
factors include:
equilibria, firms identify one (e.g., one that is focal) and then go there.
The economic logic for prohibiting the particular mechanism for equilibrium selection objected to by the law is that the conduct termed an agreement lowers the transactions cost of identifying those coordinated
equilibria that cannot be made self-evident through the establishment of a
simple focal rule.
75 Although these factors can be thought of as merely elaborating the
previously noted plus factor that the conduct be difficult to understand in
the absence of an agreement, see supra at note 65 and accompanying
text, separating them in this fashion highlights the influence of economic
developments on antitrust doctrine.
(footnote 76 appearson following page)

Section 1 dilemmas : 181
a. a market structure conducive to cooperation (including ease of
reaching the terms of agreement, and of detecting and punishing
deviation from those terms);"

76 In addition to the factors highlighted in the text, Posner in effect
suggests that direct evidence of the exercise of market power by an
industry, such as evidence of price discrimination or prices in excess of
costs, should count as a plus factor permitting a court to infer an agreement from parallel pricing in an oligopoly setting. Posner, supra note
7, at 1578-83. Such evidence, if believed, would conclusively demonstrate that the exercise of market power was possible. Antitrust enforcers
experimented unsuccessfully with this suggestion in the 1970s. The Federal Trade Commission's efforts to prove monopoly power foundered on
the difficulty of identifying cost, a problem highlighted, but perhaps
underestimated, by Posner. See Elzinga, Unmasking Monopoly: Four
Types of Evidence, in ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST PoLIcY 11-38 (R. Lamer
& J. Meehan eds. 1989). The recent development of econometric techniques for measuring market power that treat cost as an unobservable
offer the possibility that antitrust might now be able practically to adopt
Posner's suggestion. See generally, Baker & Bresnahan, EmpiricalMethods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRST L.J. 3
(1992).
77 See Montana v. SuperAmerica, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont.
1983) (no concerted action to set prices in retail gasoline market, despite
parallel pricing and price posting); cf. Ginsburg, supranote 15 (extensive
nonprice product dimensions may make coordination implausible).
A market's structure is also not conducive to coordination if an anticompetitive price rise would be defeated by new competition or deterred by
the prospect of new competition. Cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl) (analyzing likelihood of
entry in evaluating a challenge under FTC Act § 5 to unilateral practices
alleged to facilitate coordination). For this reason, entry plays a major
role in the analysis of whether mergers are likely to lessen competition
by facilitating coordination. Ordover & Baker, Entry Analysis Under the
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 139 (1992).
Moreover, if the alleged conspirators are distant rivals, for example
because the products they sell are so highly differentiated as to make
each firm care little about the price and output decisions of the others, the
firms may have little to gain from coordination. Such a market would not
be congenial to coordination.
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b. evidence of coercion of potential cheaters; 78 or
c. a history of express collusion among the defendants. 79
Given the powerful influence of Stigler's economic approach
to cooperation in merger analysis, 80 and the pervasive influence of
economic analysis throughout antitrust since the mid-1970s, it is
not surprising that economic plausibility plus factors have played
78
E.g., Ambook Enters., 612 F.2d at 616; Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 1979). For
such conduct to be considered coercive, the court must presumably have
some basis for distinguishing the possibility that the coercing firm was
merely meeting competition. Cf. 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at 1408b2
(evaluating fairness to the coercing firm when finding a coerced conspiracy).

79 See Proposed Modification of Existing Judgments, U.S. v. General
Electric, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (1977). Express collusion in related settings, for example among firms in the same industry but in different geographic markets, or among the same firms in some other market, would
also suggest that the economic environment is conducive to collusion to
the extent the industry structure in the related market is similar to that of
the market at issue. See generally, 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at 1421.
80 An analysis of the economic plausibility of cooperation has become
a staple of merger review at the federal enforcement agencies and,
increasingly, the focus as well of judicial review of proposed acquisitions. Beginning with the promulgation of the 1982 Merger Guidelines,
the Justice Department's investigation of mergers has incorporated "other
factors" (beyond concentration and entry), reflecting the ability of firms
to monitor and police an agreement, into the analysis of the likelihood that a merger will cause a competitive industry to cooperate. 1982
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102 § III.C; cf. Posner, supra note 7, at 1603-04 (recommending a
similar approach to merger analysis). These factors remain part of the
coordinated competitive effects analysis in the 1992 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 16, at §§ 2.11, 2.12. In the courts, Stigler's influence on
merger analysis is apparent in the increasing sympathy of judges toward
the defense that the specific industry at issue is not susceptible to cooperation because of the presence of a large or sophisticated buyer, which
deters coordination through its ability to induce a seller to deviate. See
generally, Pratt, The "SophisticatedBuyer" Defense in Merger Litigation
GainsMomentum, 6 ANTiTRUST 9 (Spring 1992).
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an increasingly significant role in identifying an agreement from
circumstantial evidence in parallel conduct cases. 81 But the secret
agreement plus factors have remained primary; courts writing
since Stigler's 1964 article have ignored the economic plausibility
factors as much as they have employed them.
The limited role for the economic plausibility plus factors in
the immediate wake of Stigler's article is suggested by an appellate opinion from 1979, written after Stigler's landmark article but
before the judicial success of the Chicago revolution was assured.
In the 1979 decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld the criminal conviction of nine real estate brokers in a Maryland county under
Sherman Act § 1.82 The brokers were found to have agreed to raise
their commission rate on listed houses from six percent to seven
percent. The evidence for an agreement was entirely circumstantial. 83 The court noted, inter alia, that one broker raised the rate
reported in the local multiple listing service to seven percent in
response to an anonymous complaint that it had accepted a six
percent listing, while secretly rebating one percent to the seller.
This fact was treated as favoring the inference of an agreement,
on the ground that it showed the defendant's intention to agree
81
However, some antitrust prosecutors contend that evidence about
the economic plausibility of an agreement is more likely to be confusing
than probative to the fact finder, especially when a conspiracy can be
established through direct evidence. See generally, Gorey, Jr. & Einhorn,

The Use and Misuse of Economic Evidence in Horizontal Price-Fixing

Cases, 12 J. Cogrnmp,. L. 1 (1986).
87 United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980).
83 At a dinner meeting of leading realtors, one broker announced a
plan to raise commission rates. In the ensuing discussion, the competing
firms gave the impression that they would follow. The first broker in fact
raised commission rates, and over the next few months, its rivals raised
rates as well. All the firms knew that collective action was necessary for
a rate increase to be successful, because the other firms had not gone
along when one broker had previously raised rates unilaterally. Some
firms also complained to those rivals who continued to accept some listing at the old commission rate.
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and that it demonstrated that intention to the co-conspirators. A
court more heavily influenced by Stigler, in contrast, would have
acknowledged that this fact also cuts against the inference of
agreement, by demonstrating the ease by which the alleged conspirators could cheat secretly. 84 Although the decision of the circuit court to uphold the finding of conspiracy was not remarkable
on the facts of the case taken as a whole, a court more strongly
influenced by Stigler would likely have noted this difficulty with
that conclusion.8 5
The economic plausibility plus factors likely count for more
today than they did in 1979, however, because the Supreme Court,
in a 1986 decision, arguably mandated an economic analysis in
civil antitrust conspiracy litigation. In that year, the Supreme
Court decision upheld the award of summary judgment to defendants in a horizontal conspiracy case on the ground that plaintiffs'
84
The same court that ignored the implications of Stigler's article in
deciding a conspiracy case might nevertheless have given greater attention to the economic evidence concerning the ability of firms to detect
and punish deviation had two large real estate brokers in another county
sought to merge. In the merger context, an argument about the economic
plausibility of coordination would have likely possessed greater force
after 1982, however, when the Justice Department revised its merger
guidelines to incorporate economic insights derived from Stigler.
85 Even a court that undertakes an economic analysis of the plausibility of collusion can miss some potentially important points. In 1983,
for example, a district court agreed with the owner of two gasoline service stations, charged as a conspirator in a price-fixing case, that the
defendant was not a party to the conspiracy. Montana v. SuperAmerica,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1983). The court refused to find that the
defendant agreed to fix prices on the ground that its price changes could
not be distinguished from unilateral, independent decision making. In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on its conclusion that the market structure was not conducive to collusion, and on the absence of a
showing that the defendant engaged in "cartel enforcement actions."
Although this decision was likely correct, the court failed to note that the
ability of gas stations to monitor rival pricing actions quickly and
cheaply facilitates coordination, and thus weighs against its conclusion
that the economic environment was not hospitable to collusion.
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claim made "no economic sense." 6 In consequence, the lower
courts will likely now be led to give greater attention to the economic plausibility plus factors than they did in the first two
87
decades following Stigler's article.
With the increasing importance of the economic plausibility
plus factors, the first horn of the first dilemma emerges. If an
industry structure conducive to coordination counts as a plus factor tending to make the inference of an agreement more plausible,
it requires but a small additional reasoning step to conclude that it
makes "no economic sense" to infer an agreement when the
industry structure is not conducive to coordination. Courts are
already comfortable with similar reasoning in the context of
merger analysis, where they seek to determine whether a change
in market structure will lessen competition.88 Accordingly, the
analytic stage has been set for courts to conclude that in an industry with an environment not conducive to coordination, an agreement among competitors to fix price is not plausible and should

86
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587, 596, 597-98 (1986). Accord, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. _
, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1992) ("If the
plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no reasonable jury could find
in its favor and summary judgment should be granted").
87
Cf. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 53, at 8 (arguing that
since Matsushita, courts have increasingly held that the mere opportunity
to conspire, a secret agreement plus factor, is insufficient to support an
inference of conspiracy where the communication has a plausible legitimate business justification); DeSanti & Kovacic, Matsushita: Its Construction and Application by the Lower Courts, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 609,
640-41 (1991) (some lower courts applying Matsushita have assessed the
economic merits of claims).
88
There need be no logical inconsistency if courts are systematically
willing to find criminal price fixing in the same markets in which they
would refuse to find concentrating mergers anticompetitive, however,
because merger analysis is prospective and probabilistic, while a pricefixing prosecution is retrospective.
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not be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 89 This reasoning
engages the first horn of the first dilemma.
C. The emerging influence of contemporary developments
in economics
The second horn of the first dilemma emerges from contemporary developments in economics. In an industry in which firms
would readily detect and police deviations from a coordinated
arrangement, so that coordination is likely if a coordinated understanding can be reached, focal rules may provide the necessary
terms of the understanding. Hence, if the observed outcome is
consistent with a plausible focal rule, it is unlikely that the firms
reached it through the bargaining process that constitutes an
agreement under antitrust law. It would be irrational for the firms
in such an industry to agree, because they could reach a coordinated outcome without risking antitrust liability merely by making
that outcome focal. Again, an agreement would make "no economic sense."
This logic can be illustrated in the context of the hypothetical
example, discussed above, of coordination in the candy or electrical equipment industry. In the example, the focal rule for coordination involves preserving the relative price differentials in the
existing price book. The example assumes that the firms have
89 Evidence of the economic implausibility of coordination is
unlikely to be strongly probative toward proving that an unlawful conspiracy does not exist, however, when the record includes otherwise
uncontroverted direct evidence of an agreement. This situation could
arise, for example, if the firms have misperceived the ex ante likelihood
that a collusive agreement could be maintained. Similarly, it is possible
to imagine a court inferring an agreement from strong circumstantial evidence despite an economic environment uncongenial to coordination.
Indeed, in an appropriate case, evidence concerning the economic plausibility of coordination may be excluded as confusing or prejudicial under
Fed. R. Evid. 403. See generally, Gorey, Jr. & Einhorn, supra note 81.
Moreover, even when the firms correctly perceive their environment, it
will not always be easy for a court to classify an industry as conducive to
coordination or not.
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developed a method of deterring secret discounts by monitoring
and policing deviation, so that the only remaining coordination
problem is the identification of the terms of agreement. Under
such circumstances, mere price leadership-one firm announcing
that it is increasing prices by five percent-would be sufficient
for the firm to identify the terms of a coordinated arrangement by
making them focal, and thereby solve the remaining coordination
difficulty. Even if the other firms follow by matching the five percent price rise, no agreement will be found under Sherman Act § 1
even though the industry environment is, by assumption, conducive to coordination. With no additional plus factors, the
observed behavior would be deemed mere parallel conduct. As
emphasized in a recent opinion of the First Circuit, "[o]ne does
not need an agreement to bring about

.

. [a] follow-the-leader

effect in a concentrated industry." 90
Suppose that the facts now change slightly. One firm announces
it has raised all prices in its price book by five percent, effective
immediately. Some other firm calls a press conference the next
week to announce it is raising prices only three percent, effective
immediately. The remaining firms publish new price books with a
three percent price rise the next day, and the firm that initially
announced a five percent price rise also issues a new price book
the next day, now lowering its price increase to three percent.
Assume further that costs and demand do not change before or
during the price jockeying.
Applying the plus factors, this conduct might be found to constitute an agreement under Sherman Act § 1. As with any case of
parallel pricing in an oligopoly setting, the facts are consistent
with the idea that the firms are negotiating the terms of their bargain. From this perspective, the second firm vastly preferred the
90 Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484
(1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); accord,Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 69,913 at 68,370 (7th Cir. 1992); cf. 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at
1435h ("once a pricing formula comes into existence, each firm may
choose to use it solely through interdependent calculation").
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three percent price increase to a five percent increase, 91 so much
so that it attempted, successfully, to make three percent the focal
point rather than five percent. Thus, a court focusing on the plus
factors that convert parallel pricing into an unlawful agreement to
fix price might interpret the first firm's price announcement and
the second firm's press conference as communication. Moreover,
the assumptions that costs have not risen and demand did not
grow more inelastic might help supply another plus factor favoring the inference of an agreement, if a court concludes from that
fact that the common three percent price rise has no legitimate
business justification. 2 Finally, a court could recognize a third
plus factor, that the market structure is conducive to coordination,
91 The second firm might bear a disproportionately high share of the
reduction in industry demand associated with a price rise greater than
three percent, or the second firm might have cheated had the five percent
price rise been adopted by the industry.
92
In competition, a product's price will rise if its marginal cost
increases or, under some circumstances, if its demand grows more inelastic. The demand elasticity affects the competitive price if marginal cost
pricing does not lead to sufficient producers' surplus to guarantee a normal return to a new entrant (as might occur, for example, if fixed costs of
production are high). Under such circumstances, the price of some or all
products in the price book will be in excess of marginal cost in a competitive (free entry) equilibrium. The markup over marginal cost will be the
largest for those products with the most inelastic demand (although competition will constrain markups through the limitation that an entrant earn
no more than a normal return on its fixed investment). For this reason, a
rise in marginal cost or a reduction in the elasticity of demand could supply a legitimate business justification for a price increase. A further analysis would be required to determine whether the observed price increase
is commensurate with what would be expected under competition given
the magnitude of the shift in cost or the elasticity of demand, however.
Moreover it will be necessary to take into account the possibility that in
competitive equilibrium, the markup over marginal cost may vary with
exogenous factors such as the stage of the business cycle. (When price
changes follow shifts in cost or demand, the industry equilbrium could
also be coordinated; shocks to cost or demand can induce coordinating
firms to alter the terms of their understanding, as indicated supra at note
49, much as they induce a change in the competitive equilibrium.)
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given the assumption that deviation will quickly be detected and
punished.
Despite the presence of multiple plus factors, the example presents at most a close case for finding an agreement from the available circumstantial evidence, however. The court would likely be
uneasy about reaching the conclusion that the firms agreed on the
three percent price increase because of the difficulty distinguishing that inference from the view that the conduct reflected independent decision making. The first firm's five percent increase in
price was surely an independent decision, a court could say. The
second firm's decision to follow with a lower three percent
increase surely was an independent decision as well. The decision
by rivals to match, while unfortunate, may not appear suspect.
Oligopolists frequently do better by increasing price when their
rivals do, rather than by preserving a lower price and hoping
to increase their market share at the expense of the rival that
increased price. 93 For the same reason, the first firm's decision to
lower its increase to three percent may reflect an independent
decision. A court that reasons this way will consider the behavior
mere oligopolistic interdependence, not an agreement. 94 It can
defend this conclusion analytically, in terms of the plus factors,
by denying that communication has occurred and by deeming
legitimate the matching responses of the rivals. In this way, the
court would argue that the firms have not engaged in the process
93
See text supra at note 51. For this reason, once a particular outcome among the multiple outcbmes possible has been established as
focal, the industry moves rapidly to that equilibrium.
94 This inference is strengthened by the fact in the example that the
price books took effect on the date they were issued. It is surely a legitimate business practice to communicate prices to customers. Moreover,
although it is possible to imagine firms negotiating an agreement by
altering prices actually charged to customers, it will be more difficult to
infer an agreement under such circumstances than when the firms employ
future price announcements in bargaining. But cf. Reserve Supply Corp.
v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,913
(7th Cir. 1992) (advance announcements of increases to prices in price
book do not encourage the inference of an agreement to raise price when
customers require advance notice).
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that antitrust law deems an agreement because the decisions of the
first and second firms to raise price were made with the hopebut not the assurance-that rivals will follow.
The additional argument that comprises the second horn of the
first dilemma could tip the balance of this close case against
the inference of an agreement. Even though the economic environment is conducive to coordinated behavior-policing of an
agreement is feasible by assumption, and terms of coordination
can readily be identified through the application of a focal rulethe court may recognize that it may nevertheless be irrational for
the firms to agree to fix price. Why should the firms engage in the
process of negotiation and the exchange of mutual assurances, and
risk antitrust prosecution for their conduct, when the focal rule
permits them to achieve a substantial degree of coordination without additional communication? 95 A court that reasons this way
will be unlikely to see communication in the pricing decisions of
the firms, and, in consequence, will be unlikely to find plus factors present sufficient to identify an agreement.
As this example suggests, the second horn of the first dilemma
is engaged because the very features of the economic environment
that make coordination plausible can simultaneously operate to
make an agreement unnecessary for that coordination to occur.
The logic of this horn of the dilemma emerges from the insights
of contemporary economic theory, especially from the idea that
focal rules may provide the terms of a coordinated understanding.
As courts come to recognize that in an economic environment
conducive to coordination it may be irrational for the firms to
95 In contrast with the argument that forms the first horn of the
dilemma, this argument is not a sympathetic one for defendants to press
because it concedes that the industry is exercising market power. For this
reason, defendants can be expected to make it in the alternative, not conceding that the firms are presently coordinating their behavior. Defendants can also be expected to focus attention on the absence of plus
factors rather than on the presence of coordination. For example, in an
appropriate case a defendant might point out that mere price leadership is
not unlawful regardless of whether the industry environment is congenial
to coordination and regardless of whether high prices result.
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agree, they can be expected to become more skeptical of inferring
an agreement to fix price from circumstantial evidence even when
the economic plausibility plus factors are present.
In one important respect, the second horn of the first dilemma
is less powerful than the first horn. The logic of the first horn
applies to all conduct when the economic environment is not conducive to coordination; in such an environment, the argument
runs, an agreement to fix price is never rational. In contrast, the
second horn of the dilemma preserves some scope for inferring an
agreement to fix price. The gap in the logic of the second horn of
the dilemma arises when the economic environment is conducive
to coordination, but the observed industry behavior is inconsistent
with what would be expected were the firms to coordinate through
plausible focal rules. Under such circumstances, the traditional
standards for inferring an agreement from circumstantial evidence
remain unchallenged by the first dilemma.
Several types of circumstantial evidence will likely be found
important in a case in which a court infers an agreement while
rejecting defendant's argument, based on the second horn of the
first dilemma, that it would be irrational for the firms to agree
because the forbidden process is unnecessary for successful coordination. First, some behaviors are so complex that it is implausible that they would be observed absent concerted industry action.
Plausible focal rules are likely to be simply stated and readily
grasped (e.g., raise all prices a common percentage or dollar
amount, or reduce output by a common percentage). 96 Such focal
rules will likely be sufficient to generate the observed behavior of
many oligopolies, perhaps including the conduct of firms selling a
single, homogeneous product in a single geographic market. Yet
in other oligopolies, such as those in which some firms prefer a
high price for some products while other firms prefer a high price
for other products, many complex bargains among the sellers may
be unreachable by coordinating firms employing plausible focal
rules. If the observed conduct is more complex than behavior con96 Were the coordination rule instead complex, it would be difficult
for it to become self-evident absent the process of agreement.
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sistent with those plausible focal rules that would characterize
coordination in the absence of an agreement, then the inference
that the conduct arose from concerted action is strengthened.
Second, if the observed conduct lacks a plausible business
justification, it is unlikely that it arose from independent decision
making. For this reason, a weak or pretextual business justification strengthens the inference that an agreement to fix price, tacit
or express, had been reached. Third, if the rivals communicated
directly, or had the opportunity to do so, and if rival behavior
changed immediately following that communication or opportunity, the inference that an agreement was reached is also strengthened.97
In the hypothetical case discussed above, the inference of an
agreement can be strengthened with facts consistent with these
types of evidence. Suppose that instead of announcing an acrossthe-board price increase, the first firm issued a partial modification of its price book. In the substitute pages, it raised the price of
some products, lowered the price of others, and left many prices
alone. It further announced that the new prices would not take
effect for 2 months. Now suppose the industry jockeys over price
much as it did before. The second firm announces its own set of
modifications, not identical to those the first firm announced but
involving many of the same products, to take effect in the future.
The other firms follow the second firm, and the first firm goes
along by changing its modification to be identical to that adopted
by the second firm. This common set of modifications is developed during the 2-month period after the first modification was
announced. After 2 months go by, each*seller's modified price
book takes effect.
On these facts, the inference of agreement is stronger than it
was before, and an agreement might well be found by a court. The
97 These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. The inference that
the firms agreed would also be strengthened, for example, by traditional
legal evidence of conspiracy, such as evidence that the conspirators met
in a hotel room or evidence that they adopted the common price books
with the intent of facilitating coordination.
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resulting arrangement is a complex bargain, changing a host of
relative prices. It is difficult to imagine that this result would arise
without the process of agreement, even if all the negotiations take
98
place in public through issuing price books and press releases.
These facts would make it difficult for a defendant to argue that
an agreement is unnecessary for the firms to arrive at the observed
conduct. Moreover, the fact that the price jockeying took place
with proposed prices that did not take effect until after the negotiations were completed would undercut an argument that the practices had a legitimate business justification, 99 as would the
assumption that the price changes occurred in the absence of
changes in cost or the elasticity of product demand. 100 With addi98 Cf. 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at 1425a (if the defendants
"could not or would not have acted as they did without advance communication and understanding, then their action .necessarily proves a traditional conspiracy"); but cf. id. at 1425d4 (idiosyncratic pricing formula
could have been adopted independently by firms acting sequentially).
The inference of an agreement would be especially compelling if the
price changes in the proposed modifications raise many prices significantly relative to the price increases that would result from the application of a plausible focal coordination rule. (A bargain more complex than
what plausible focal rules make feasible will raise joint industry profits
as well as some prices, but it may be impossible to determine whether
profits have increased because economic profits are difficult to infer from
accounting data.)

99 Advance price announcements may have legitimate business justifications, as when they are desired by buyers to reduce the costs of
searching for the best price. But the fact that buyers accelerate purchases
when price increases are announced does not necessarily legitimate the
practice or count against finding an agreement. Such buyer behavior
would be observed regardless of whether the firms are acting independently or concertedly; even the customers of a monopolist would be
delighted to receive advance notice of price changes. In any event, there
may be other, potentially less restrictive ways of providing buyers with
price protection, such as allowing buyers to purchase in advance of delivery.
100 The fact that the price modifications were limited to some but not
all products, rather than taking the form of issuing a new price book in its
entirety, probably strengthens the case for finding an agreement. This
method of communication serves to highlight those price changes under
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tional circumstantial evidence of agreement, moreover, the case
for inferring an agreement from circumstantial evidence, already
strong, could be made overwhelming.'10
As this example demonstrates, the second horn of the dilemma
does not purport to rule out all possibility that the firms have
reached an agreement. In this respect, the second horn stands
in contrast with the first horn of the dilemma, which leads to
an unqualified inference of the irrationality of an agreement. 0 2
Nevertheless, the second horn will apply and make a court reluctant to infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence in many
cases in which that inference would readily have been made previously.
negotiation. But this anticompetitive interpretation of the form of the
negotiations is weakened if it would be markedly more expensive to reissue the full price book than to issue substitute pages; this latter assumption would supply a legitimate cost-based explanation for the practice.
101 Such additional e.vidence might include, for example, a demonstration that retailers and ultimate consumers pay little or no attention to
advance price announcements (further undercutting the possibility of a
business justification), evidence that the firms met at a trade association
during the brief time between the first firm's price modification
announcement and the second firm's adjustment to that proposal (direct
communication), or testimonial or documentary evidence that the price
book modifications were issued with an intent to coordinate. Cf. In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990) (a jury could find an agreement to fix price
from evidence of parallel pricing, direct contacts among defendants,
advance price announcements, posting of prices in unusual detail, the
absence of a business justification for advance price announcements, and
evidence that these practices were intended to lead to higher prices), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991); 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at 1435g
("even lawful unilateral action involving price books might be enough to
tip the balance toward a conspiracy finding" when, for example, "competitors hold meetings after a departure from uniform pricing").
102
In industries in which the first dilemma undercuts the inference of
an agreement, successful prosecutions of horizontal restraints under § 1
will be more likely to rely on direct evidence of an agreement, or take the
form of a challenge to an obvious concerted industry practice as unreasonable, rather than attempt to prove an agreement from circumstantial
evidence.
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As antitrust law recognizes the significance of recent developments in economics, the first dilemma for Sherman Act § 1
enforcement emerges. Stigler's insights about oligopoly led to the
emergence of the first horn of the dilemma, and contemporary
developments in oligopoly theory create the conditions in which
the logic of the second horn may become more apparent. The first
dilemma explains why it might be irrational for firms to reach an
agreement, even when the traditional plus factors indicative of a
secret conspiracy are present. This dilemma has scope to flower
because the legal idea of an agreement is about a different phenomenon than the economic idea of a coordinated equilibrium
outcome: the legal idea of an agreement describes a process by
which an industry reaches an economic outcome in the marketplace, while the economic idea of an equilibrium describes the
3
outcome itself.10
In the wake of Stigler, it may have appeared possible to bridge
the distinction between these legal and economic ideas. The distinction between competition and cooperation embodied in a
Stiglerian one-shot game might appear isomorphic to the distinction antitrust law makes between an illegal agreement and mere
interdependent oligopoly behavior. But the contemporary economic idea of coordination, arising from the repeated game
framework, helps clarify the difficulty of sustaining a simple correspondence between the legal and economic ideas.
The economic idea of coordination does have one point of
commonality with the legal idea of an agreement. Under the economic definition of coordination, firms are coordinating if, in
equilibrium, they adopt strategies that depend on history. 10 For
example, a firm that commits to punish a rival in the next period
if the rival deviates from the terms of coordination this period
will determine its price and output decisions through a strategy
that depends on history. This idea might form part of the intuitive
concept of an agreement in conspiracy law. But it is difficult to
103

See supra at notes 73-74 and accompanying text.

104

Coordination is defined supra at note 22.
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work up much enthusiasm for the view that the legal idea of an
agreement to fix price is or should be equated with this economic
idea of coordination,105 for two reasons. First, it would take a
refined and educated imagination to conceive of the intuitive legal
idea of negotiating an agreement as tantamount to adopting a
strategy dependent on history. Second, if antitrust were to deem
coordinated behavior in the economic sense to be the essence of a
violation of Sherman Act § 1, it would be nearly impossible in
practice to demonstrate a § 1 agreement from circumstantial evidence. The difference between conduct that would violate the
statute (carrying out a previously developed strategy in which a
firm's behavior depends on history) and lawful conduct (adopting
single period strategies while responding to what is learned from
the past about the cost or demand curves facing a firm and its
rivals) is subtle at best. Developments in economics are likely to
make courts more reluctant to infer an agreement to fix price from
circumstantial evidence not by altering antitrust law's definition
of an agreement, but, as indicated by the first dilemma, by highlighting features of the economic environment that make implausible the inference that the legal definition has been satisfied.
III. The second dilemma: addressing the oligopoly problem
A second dilemma for antitrust policy arises as a consequence
of the emergence of the first dilemma. On the one hand, the first
dilemma implies that it is likely to become more difficult to prove
an agreement to fix price from circumstantial evidence. On the
other hand, as will be explained in this section, contemporary
developments in economics, including the theoretical developments that gave rise to the first dilemma, suggest that the
oligopoly problem is more serious than previously thought.
From a theoretical economic perspective, the folk theorem
emphasizes that concentrated industries are more hospitable to
105

But cf. Yao & DeSanti, supra note 7, at text accompanying notes

58--64 (examining possible observable distinctions between one-shot and
repeated games).
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coordination, and to achieving higher than competitive prices,
than they appeared to Chicago-oriented commentators heavily
influenced by Stigler. This view from theory is confirmed by what
can be inferred about business practice from the lectures of academic business strategists. Business school faculty teaching strategy routinely counsel their students that managers working for
oligopolists should implement practices that would facilitate coordination. 106
Recent empirical industrial organization economics research
also confirms that oligopolies are often able to exercise significant market power. The development in the 1980s of new
empirical statistical techniques for measuring market power in
individual industries frequently permits more precise inferences
about the performance of specific oligopolies than were available
from prior studies employing older empirical approaches.10 7 These
106 The standard business school case examines the strategies of General Electric and Westinghouse in the years following their criminal
price-fixing convictions. E.g., M.

PORTER, CASES IN CoMPETrIVE STRATEGY

102-18 (1983). To raise prices without express negotiation, the firms
introduced standardized product definitions, published price books, and
committed themselves to buyer protection policies (meeting competition
and most favored nations clauses). Proposed Modification of Existing
Judgments, U.S. v. General Electric, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (1977). Some
teaching this case suggest that mere "signaling" (as through the publication of price books after standardizing product definitions) is sufficient
for the industry to achieve high prices; others emphasize the need to deter
cheating (for example, by adopting buyer protection policies). Cf.
M. PORTER, supra note 38, at 93-95 (encouraging firms to seek to
improve all firms' positions by employing active market signaling
through announcements, selective advertising to discipline recalcitrant
rivals, and price leadership); id. at 106 (advocating standardization to
simplify industry prices and other decision variables so that a focal point
can be established for the industry).
107
The older empirical tradition emphasizes the cross-industry relationship between performance measures and concentration. Studies
adopting this approach show some tendency for price-cost margins to
increase with concentration, but little relationship between concentration
and profits. Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 976, 988
(R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds. 1989) (Stylized Facts 4.5, 5.1). While
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studies show that a great deal of market power exists in some concentrated industries, and that anticompetitive conduct is a significant cause of high price-cost margins. 10 8 Oligopolies may not
inevitably charge supracompetitive prices, but, as contemporary
developments in economic theory suggest, and both business
practice and the results of applying new empirical tools confirm,
oligopolistic coordination is a genuine concern in many concentrated industries.
Post-Stiglerian theoretical economic insights-the recognition
that repeated games are more conducive to coordination than oneshot games, the recognition that coordination may be imperfect
and incomplete, and the recognition that focal rules simplify
the task of reaching the terms of coordination-combine with the
empirical evidence developed from the application of new econometric tools for identifying and measuring market power and the
evidence about business practice to renew antitrust's traditional
concern about the breadth and significance of the oligopoly problem. Antitrust's second Sherman Act § 1 dilemma is that this
renewed concern about the performance of oligopolies has arisen
at the same time the traditional tool for addressing the oligopoly
problem, the horizontal agreement prohibition of the Sherman
Act, has become less potent through the operation of the first
dilemma.
these results are consistent with the view that some oligopolies are able
to exercise market power, the severe methodological difficulties with this
approach make it difficult to have confidence in that inference. Profits
and price-cost margins can be positively related to concentration either
because concentration allows industries to exercise market power, or
because firms with low costs simultaneously grow large in market share
and receive high profit margins. Moreover, the performance data
employed in these studies are suspect because accounting measures of
both profits and marginal costs are typically poor proxies for the relevant
economic concepts. Comparisons of prices in different markets in the
same industry address this latter difficulty in part, however, to the extent
the assumption that costs are identical across markets is plausible.
108 Bresnahan, supra note 53, at 1052-53 (conclusions A and B); see
Baker and Bresnahan, supra note 76 (collecting more recent studies).
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IV. Two antitrust remedies: merger enforcement
and rulemaking
This section examines two methods for addresssing the oligopoly problem that supplement the use of Sherman Act § 1,
antitrust law's traditional tool for policing oligopoly conduct. The
discussion of merger enforcement, the first such method, emphasizes the way contemporary developments in economics may permit courts and enforcers to differentiate those acquisitions likely
to make coordination worse from those likely to destabilize coordination. The discussion of rulemaking, the second remedial
approach, examines the ability of the Federal Trade Commission
to prohibit practices facilitating oligopoly coordination in individual industries by rule. The limitations of Sherman Act § 1
highlighted by the second dilemma increase the importance of
employing alternative remedial tools such as these to address the
oligopoly problem.
A. Addressing the oligopoly problem through
merger enforcement
Clayton Act § 7's prohibition of mergers that tend to "lessen
competition" or "create a monopoly"' 09 permits courts to interdict
changes in market structure that would facilitate coordination." 0
Moreover, no large merger can be consummated until government
enforcers have been given an opportunity to review the acquisition for possible violations of this statute."' These merger review
statutes give antitrust enforcers the opportunity to examine the
structure and behavior of a wide array of industries, to identify
those markets with a structure congenial to coordination, and to
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
110 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the government enforcement agencies also recognize that antitrust law reaches acquisitions likely
to lessen competition through altering the unilateral behavior of the
merged firm. Supra note 16, at § 2.2.
M 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988) (Hart-Scott-Rodino Act).
'0
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determine whether proposed acquisitions are likely to make coordination more effective or more complete. By challenging
acquisitions likely to enhance coordination, while permitting
acquisitions likely to destabilize coordination, antitrust enforcers
can improve the functioning of some oligopoly industries. This
tool for addressing the oligopoly problem is limited, however,
because it can only be applied to firms that seek to merge.
The judicial approach to determining whether proposed acquisitions are likely to lessen competition by enhancing coordination
has long been influenced by developments in economics. When
thestructural school was dominant, courts and enforcers exhibited
a great deal of hostility toward increases in concentration in oligopoly industries, even if those increases were small. 112 Merger analysis in the courts and enforcement agencies has been transformed
in the last decade, however, as it has come to embrace Stigler's
insights into oligopoly behavior. Stigler's approach has permitted
courts and enforcers to analyze the plausibility of coordination
industry-by-industry, and so to determine, for example, whether
entry would undercut the exercise of market power or whether
firms would refuse to coordinate for fear of rival cheating. Both
the enforcement agencies and the courts now approach merger
review by undertaking a detailed fact-intensive analysis of market
structure and conduct in order to determine whether coordination
could be successful. Courts are no longer reluctant to allow sizable acquisitions in a concentrated industry if their economic
analysis demonstrates that the industry is not susceptible to the
exercise of market power.113
Stigler's insights into oligopoly behavior gave courts and
enforcers a method for identifying individual industries in which
coordination was unlikely regardless of concentration. But once
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963);
1968 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
112

13,101.
113
E.g. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1990); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1984).
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an industry was identified as one in which coordination was economically plausible, the Stiglerian analysis offered little basis for
discriminating between those mergers likely to enhance coordination and those not likely to do so. In consequence, the structuralist
presumption that the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct
increases with concentration has remained important in merger
analysis, albeit only with respect to those industries in which the
economic environment is conducive to coordination." 4 As a strategy for addressing the oligopoly problem, this approach to merger
enforcement is defensive. 15 The presumption of anticompetitive
effect from nontrivial increases in concentration in industries susceptible to coordination aims to keep oligopolies from performing
worse, but not to distinguish mergers likely to destabilize existing
coordination from those likely to enhance coordination.
Contemporary developments in economic theory offer the
promise of allowing courts and enforcers to take the offensive in
exploiting merger policy to address the threat of oligopoly coordination." 6 A fourth insight about oligopoly behavior derived from
114
United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1990); see 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 1.51.

115
Cf. 6 P. AREBDA, supra note 58, at 1432d5 (describing the "containment" approach of addressing the oligopoly problem through prohibiting concentrating mergers and facilitating practices).
116
Other developments in economics make the presumption of anticompetitive effect arising from increases in concentration appear less
attractive today than 30 years ago. The empirical literature does recognize some tendency for price-cost margins to increase with concentration
on average across industries. Schmalensee, supra note 107, at 988 (Stylized Fact 5.1). But the weakness of this statistical relationship suggests
that the specific attributes of the industry and the nature of the increase in
concentration play a leading role in determining whether any given
merger will enhance coordination. Accordingly, while enforcement decisions based solely on applying a presumption of anticompetitive effect
from concentration may be correct on average, their precision can likely
be improved substantially by incorporating information about the specific
industry and the specific acquisition. Moreover, while many if not most
theoretical models of oligopoly behavior predict higher prices from
increases in market concentration, economic theorists now treat concen-
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post-Stiglerian developments in economic theory can be exploited
to predict the effect on coordination of specific mergers within
industries in which coordination is economically plausible. To the
extent enforcers and courts can learn to make such predictions
with confidence, they can prohibit those mergers likely to make
coordination more effective or more complete, while permitting
those mergers likely to destabilize existing coordination.
The fourth contemporary economic insight into oligopoly
behavior is that certain firms-mavericks-may limit the ability
of their industry to coordinate more completely. A firm need not
behave disruptively to play this role. Rather, certain specific firms
may constrain more effective coordination, without ever deviating
from the terms of the coordinated agreement, even though other
firms in the oligopoly would be willing to make coordination
more effective.1 1 7 Especially when coordination is based on focal
rules, it is likely that a single firm (or a few similar firms) will
constrain coordination in this way.
Mavericks are likely to exist in coordinated equilibria when
firms differ in significant ways. Whatever the focal coordination
rule, some firms will benefit from cheating more than will others.
tration as much as the result of the way firms invest and interact (including their exercise of market power), than as a cause or indicator of market power. E.g., J. SUTrroN, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE: PRICE
CoMPETrrioN, ADVERTISING, AND THE EvoLUTiON OF CONCENTRATION (1991).

Cf. Harrington, The Determinationof Price and Output Quotas in
a Heterogeneous Cartel, 32 INT'L ECON. REV. 737 (1991) (when the coordinated equilibrium is selected to satisfy the Nash bargaining solution,
the equilibrium price may decline as the high-cost firm's costs increase).
The maverick need not be the firm that attempts to change the terms of
the coordinated understanding by establishing a new focal equilibrium
(e.g., the price leader), although it could play this role. See Rotemberg &
Saloner, Collusive Price Leadership, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 93 (1990). If a
firm would find the competitive outcome more profitable than its earnings under any plausible focal rule, see supra at note 8 & note 48, and if
the remaining firms would not find coordination profitable were that firm
excluded from the coordinated understanding, the firm is in effect a maverick so powerful as to inhibit coordination altogether.
117
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Whatever the set of credible punishments with which the coordinating firms would threaten cheaters, those punishments will hurt
some firms more than others.11 8 Hence, given the coordination
rules that define the high price outcome and the punishment
threat, some firms will likely have little temptation to deviate
after comparing the benefits of cheating to the cost, while other
firms will find themselves nearly indifferent. Those firms that are
nearly indifferent constrain the effectiveness of coordination more
than do those rivals for whom it is an easy decision to adhere to
the coordinated arrangement.1 19
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize this point
by noting that certain structural characteristics might give a firm
"a greater economic incentive to deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of their rivals."' 20 The Guidelines provide
three examples. First, if many firms in a market face capacity constraints, a firm with an atypically large amount of excess or
divertable capacity in relation to its sales or total capacity may
gain the most from deviation, and therefore have the greatest
incentive to cheat. Second, a firm might have a larger incentive to
cheat than its rivals if it is able to expand sales cheaply through
captive production for a downstream affiliate. Third, a firm might
be more willing to deviate in a market in which products are differentiated if its products are considered close substitutes by the
current customers of its rivals. These examples do not exhaust the
set of plausible structural attributes of a maverick. 21
118 For example, if punishment would require all firms to expand output by the same percentage, firms with predominately high-cost excess
capacity may find their assigned punishment role more expensive than do
their rivals of low-cost excess capacity.
119 If the firms were able to agree on the joint profit-maximizing outcome, most likely all would simultaneously be indifferent between following the terms of coordination and deviating from those terms. In this
limiting case, all firms would constrain more effective coordination
equally and each would be a maverick.
120
1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.12.
121
In vertically-related markets in which both upstream and downstream prices are in excess of cost, a firm that participates more in the
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The idea of a maverick permits courts and enforcers to identify
whether a particular merger in an industry congenial to coordination is likely to lessen competition by enhancing coordination.
An acquisition in the market can lessen competition by altering
the incentives of a maverick to go along with the terms of a coordinated understanding rather than deviate from them. If a binding
constraint on the success of coordination is thereby relaxed, more
effective or more complete coordination can emerge. This result
can occur in two ways.'2
First, a maverick may be one of the parties to the acquisition.
For example, suppose the constraint on enhanced coordination
comes from a small firm with a low rate of capacity utilization.
This firm may have a substantial incentive to employ its excess
capacity to cheat. Its acquisition by a large firm with a higher
degree of capacity utilization will likely create a merged firm with
a utilization rate closer to the large firm's premerger utilization
rate than to the small firm's rate. The result may be to shift the
identity of the firm that constrains enhanced industry coordination, from the acquired firm to the industry participant with the
lowest utilization percentage after the merger. If the new constraining firm would accept a significantly higher price before
becoming nearly indifferent to following the terms of the coordinated understanding or deviating from them, this merger will
downstream market than in the upstream market (by buying from other
upstream producers more of the upstream product than it produces captively) is likely to have a greater incentive to deviate on a coordinated
understanding limited to raising the upstream price than would an
upstream producer whose primary loyalty is to the upstream market. See
B.F. Goodrich, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,519 at 22,161-66 (1988).
Other examples might involve structural factors affecting the incentives
of firms not to go along with the punishment that would be required in
the event deviation were to occur. For example, a firm with little excess
or divertable low cost capacity may be the least willing to participate in
the output increase that might be required to punish deviation.
12
In the examples below, the maverick is nearly indifferent between
going along with the high price arrangement or deviating from it. Similar
examples could be created in which the merger affects the incentives of a
firm nearly indifferent to participating in the necessary punishment.
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likely lead to that higher price. More generally, the merged firm
may reduce the constraint on oligopoly coordination relative to
the constraint posed by one of the merger partners before the
acquisition, and so relax the binding constraint on coordination in
the marketplace.12 3
Second, the merger of nonmaverick firms may alter the incentives facing a maverick, thereby enhancing coordination. If an
acquisition lowers the marginal production costs of the merger
partners, for example, the merged firm may find its assigned punishment role less costly than the merger partners previously
found. On the margin, the merged firm may become willing to
punish more severely, should any rival deviate.1 24 Recognizing
this, the maverick will be less willing to cheat than before. In consequence, coordination will be enhanced without inducing the
maverick to deviate. The merger again relaxes the binding constraint on oligopoly coordination, leading to higher prices. 125
Other mergers in the same industries might destabilize existing coordination, even though they increase concentration. For
example, a merger involving a maverick might lower the merged
Even if the merger does not change the identity of the firm that
constrains coordination, it may relax the constraint imposed by the maverick, and so raise the equilibrium price, for example by giving the
maverick an incentive to increase price unilaterally. See 1992 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 16, at § 2.2.
123

124
Punishment need not involve a price below cost in order for the
merger to make punishment less costly, as discussed supra at notes
26-27 and accompanying text. The punishment price will likely be in
excess of marginal cost if punishment takes the form of a return to a
static noncooperative equilibrium; price exceeds marginal cost, for example, in homogeneous product Cournot equilibrium, differentiated product
Bertrand equilibrium, and homogeneous product Bertrand equilibrium
when marginal costs are rising.
12s
The lower production cost in the example may constitute a social
benefit that could be weighed against the enhanced coordination in an
efficiency calculus. In the example, the industry price will likely rise
with merger, despite the efficiency, because the merging firms do not
constrain coordination so are not induced to deviate by the cost reduction.
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firm's marginal cost of production and distribution. Such a merger
could enhance competition by tightening an already binding constraint on coordination. Alternatively, a merger involving nonmaverick firms may cause those firms to become less willing to
punish a deviating rival. 126 This result might arise, for example, if
large firms in the industry are expected to bear a disproportionately high share of the expenses of punishing deviation. In this
setting, a maverick may be encouraged to price more aggressively
by an acquisition that turns two small nonmaverick sellers into a
large nonmaverick rival. Then the merger will increase the constraint the maverick places on industry coordination. These more
competitive outcomes are unlikely to constitute the motive for
merger, because the enhanced competition will tend to lower profits by lowering the market price. But increased competition may
nevertheless arise as the fortunate consequence of an acquisition
motivated by the desire to achieve efficiencies, particularly when
the efficiencies accrue in markets other than those in which coor127
dination is destabilized.
These examples show how the idea of a maverick provides a
basis for explaining why the particular increase in concentration
proposed in a specific acquisition will enhance or reduce the ability of an industry to coordinate. In this way, developments in economic theory offer the promise of allowing antitrust enforcers to
distinguish those acquisitions likely to enhance coordination from
those likely to destabilize coordination, based on an analysis of
the transaction that goes beyond the traditional presumption that
an increase in concentration facilitates coordination on average.
To the extent this promise can become a reality, 128 it will provide
See, e.g., Davidson & Deneckre, Horizontal Mergers and Collu12
sive Behavior, 2 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 117 (1984).
127
Accordingly, the possibility that coordination would be destabilized provides no basis for justifying a merger that does not generate efficiencies in some market.
It will not always be possible to obtain sufficient information
128
about the specific market and merger at issue to determine the identity of
the industry's mavericks and whether the merger will enhance or reduce
the incentives of a maverick to coordinate. Under such circumstances,
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courts and enforcers with an improved tool with which to address
the oligopoly problem.
B. Addressing the oligopoly problem through rulemaking
For more than three decades, courts and commentators evaluating parallel conduct under Sherman Act § 1 have felt frustration
that the mere exercise of market power by a firm or group of firms
cannot be made illegal. 129 Without proof of an agreement, Sherman Act § 1 is not violated. An unsuccessful legislative
effort to secure no-fault demonopolization and a largely academic
suggestion that Sherman Act § 2 be read to apply to shared
monopolization, both dating from the late 1960s and early 1970s,
were well-intentioned but fundamentally unworkable efforts to
0
end this frustration.13
The prior legal approaches to addressing the social harm of
oligopoly foundered on two difficulties. The first difficulty, affecting both remedial approaches, is that the social costs of dissolving
large enterprises are substantial. These include the loss in scale
and scope economies, the litigation costs required to demonstrate
at trial that the industry at issue is exercising market power, and
the cost of disrupting the economic activities in which the organi3
zation is engaged.' '
courts and enforcers can be expected to continue to employ a structural
merger policy, hostile to significant increases in concentration in
oligopoly markets conducive to coordination.
'29
A similar frustration has infected Sherman Act § 2 jurisprudence.
The offense of monopolization requires proof of an overt act harmful to
competition as well as proof of monopoly power, to avoid prosecuting a
successful firm that has achieved a high market share or high price-cost
margin through "superior skill, foresight, and industry." United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945); accord,
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
130
These initiatives are described supra at note 56.
131
Although antitrust accepts similar social costs in prohibiting
mergers likely to lessen competition, such costs are much greater when
firms are dissolved than when a curative divestiture resolves an otherwise
anticompetitive merger. In the merger context, structural relief usually
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The second difficulty applies to all efforts to attack oligopolies through adjudication-whether seeking to deem oligopolistic
behavior an agreement under Sherman Act § 1, monopolization under Sherman Act § 2, or an unfair method of competition
under Federal Trade Commission Act § 5. Antitrust adjudication requires proof that each defendant violated the law through
some anticompetitive act; the mere demonstration that firms have
exercised market power is insufficient to hold a firm liable for its
past conduct.13 2 Accordingly, antitrust liability requires, in addition to proof of market power, proof of concerted action under
Sherman Act § 1, proof of a deliberate bad act under Sherman Act
§ 2,133 and, according to one appellate panel, proof of an agreement or other indicator of oppressiveness under FTC Act § 5.13
affects only one firm; in contrast, industrial restructuring could involve
an entire industry. Moreover, merging firms are typically not permitted to
integrate their operations until a governmental challenge is resolved.
Hence, if structural relief is required in the merger context, it can often
be accomplished by the sale of a division of one of the merger partners,
without disrupting an existing economic organization. Moreover, when
the anticompetitive aspects of the transaction affect only a small part of
the activities of the merging firms, and when they do not affect the activities central to the business motivation for the transaction, the firms themselves often offer their internal expertise in a largely nonadversarial
negotiation to identify ways of carving out the necessary divestitures
without sacrificing scale and scope economies. This process, available
only in the review of mergers, also helps minimize the litigation costs
associated with the divestiture.
132
If a horizontal restraint is deemed "naked," so that the per se rule
of Sherman Act § 1 applies, however, market power is presumed to exist
without need for demonstration. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441
U.S. 1 (1979).
133
See generally, ABA ANITRUST SECTION, supra note 53, at 195259.
134
Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 139. But see infra at notes 142-47 and accompanying text (questioning this holding). The appellate panel suggested
that evidence of anticompetitive intent or the absence of a legitimate
business justification might provide the necessary indicia of oppressiveness.
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In each case, no individual firm is held liable for its past behavior
unless it had the choice of acting otherwise. Because it is often
difficult for plaintiffs or prosecutors to prove such an anticompetitive act, especially to the extent the first dilemma is troublesome
to courts, the oligopoly problem has to a significant extent
become immune from attack through adjudication under these
35
antitrust laws.
Regulation through rulemaking addresses both problems.
Instead of dissolving firms, the regulatory approach proscribes
certain specified conduct in a particular industry, such as a practice that facilitates coordination in that industry, regardless of
whether the practice is unilateral or coordinated. 36 Rules can generally be tailored more carefully than divestitures to avoid forcing
firms to give up scale and scope economies in production. Moreover, rulemaking avoids the need to prove an anticompetitive act
because it attacks a harmful practice prospectively. Although evidence of the effect of past conduct is typically relied upon to
prove future harm, rulemaking does not seek to hold specific
firms liable for past behavior.1 37 A firm engaged in the challenged
practice is not accused of moral culpability and is not exposed to
punishment for past conduct. 38 As with all regulation, a rule pro135 It may sometimes be possible to expand the reach of traditional
adjudication through creative advocacy, however. Practices facilitating
coordination that are incorporated in contracts between sellers and their
customers, such as price protection clauses, can be challenged under
Sherman Act § 1 despite the absence of an agreement among the sellers if
the vertical contracts incorporating the price protection provision are
found to satisfy the agreement requirement of § 1. Simons, Fixing Price
with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with Competitor-BasedFormula Pricing Clauses, 17 I"oFSTRA L. REV. 599, 630 (1989).
136

For examples, see note 157 infra and accompanying text.

137
A rule applies to all firms, including those entering the market
after it takes effect. In contrast, an adjudication applies only to those
firms named as defendants.
138
Cf. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) (in an adjudication, the FTC
cannot condemn a respondent's conduct as unfair when the defendant has
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hibiting the prospective employment of a specific practice merely
reflects a policy judgment, based on an evidentiary record developed with procedural protections to the firms that will be affected,
that the industry would likely perform better if the practice were
changed.

-

The Federal Trade Commission already has the power to pro139
mulgate rules prohibiting unfair methods of competition,
although it has rarely exercised that power. 140 The Commission's
rulemaking power most likely permits it to address oligopoly
behavior by challenging practices facilitating coordination through
informal rulemaking, regardless of whether the practices were
adopted collectively or unilaterally. The expansive language of
one appellate opinion makes this an open question, however. In
the 1984 Ethyl decision, a Second Circuit panel held that "before
business conduct in an oligopolistic industry may be labelled
'unfair' within the meaning of § 5, a minimum standard demands
that, absent a tacit agreement, at least some indicia of oppressiveno anticompetitive motive and no ability to profit from the alleged reduction in competition).
139
The FTC's power to issue rules proscribing unfair methods of
competition derives from 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (FTC Act § 6(g)). Nat'l
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); see Order Denying Petition No. 5 of the
Nat'l Fire Protection Ass'n, 1979-1983 Transfer Binder, Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 21,771 (1980). Its competition rulemaking power is exercised
pursuant to the informal procedures delineated in Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); see 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (1988) (Magnuson-Moss amendments do not apply to rules proscribing unfair
methods of competition). Rules are issued after notice and comment, with
an oral hearing at the discretion of the Commission, and with a statement
of findings and reasons. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.21-1.26 (1992) (FTCrulemaking
procedures for rules promulgated pursuant to authority other than the
Magnuson-Moss Act). The Commission enforces rules promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing a cease and
desist order, and by seeking contempt sanctions in federal court if that
order is violated. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988) (FTC Act § 5(b)).
140
Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission,

58 AN=RUST L.J. 43, 91 n.103 (1989).
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ness must exist such as (1) evidence of anticompetitive intent or
purpose . . . , or (2) the absence of an independent legitimate
business reason for [the] conduct."' 14 1 Because the FTC's rulemaking power in competition cases derives from its powers under
FTC Act § 5, Ethyl could be read to require the Commission to
identify an agreement or other indicator of oppressiveness before
it prohibits an unfair practice by rule as well as by adjudication.
It would not be surprising if other circuits refused to read the
requirement of oppressiveness into the FTC Act, however, even in
the context of an adjudication, for two reasons. First, the Supreme
Court has long recognized that the prohibition against "unfair"
conduct in FTC Act § 5 is extremely broad, reaching conduct that
also violates the Sherman Act or Clayton Act, conduct that violates the "spirit" of those antitrust laws, and conduct that offends
142
public values beyond the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws.
Although the practices that the FTC soight to proscribe in the
Ethyl litigation did not violate the Sherman Act, because they
were adopted unilaterally by the firms, only with a remarkably
constricted view of the "spirit" of the antitrust laws could the Second Circuit panel hold that the statute did not reach the challenged practices. 43 Contrary to the appellate panel's view, the
141 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d
Cir. 1984) (Ethyl). In the Ethyl litigation, the FTC sought to prohibit
three practices adopted unilaterally by four manufacturers of lead antiknock gasoline: selling the product at a delivered price (including transportation costs), giving customers advance notice of price increases, and
agreeing to "most favored nation" provisions in contracts with customers
(guaranteeing that no other customer would be charged a lower price).
The Commission argued that these practices facilitated supracompetitive
pricing.
142
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986); FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe
Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
14
The Commission found that the challenged practices were unreasonable, after applying under FTC Act § 5 the analytic approach
required by the "rule of reason" under Sherman Act § 1. It carefully
weighed the deleterious effect of the challenged practices in facilitating
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Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the FTC may condemn a unilateral act under FTC Act § 5 when an agreement to
engage in the identical conduct would violate Sherman Act § 1.144
interfirm coordination against their beneficial role in reducing the costs
of consumer search. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 607-44 (1983).
Cf. Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 143 (concurring opinion acknowledges that the
noncollusive adoption of practices facilitating collusion contravenes the
spirit of § 1). But cf. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) (the FTC may not forbid a monopolist's practices by adjudication under § 5, even though the
social harms from the practices outweigh the benefits, when the practices
harm competition in a market in which the monopolist does not participate and when the monopolist has no anticompetitive motive).
14 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 n.19 (1948) (dictum)
(basing point pricing); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455
(1922) (dictum) (resale price maintenance); see FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 399-401 (1953) (dissent interprets
majority opinion as extending FTC Act § 5 to encompass practices that
would not violate Sherman Act § 1 because they were unilateral) (exclusive dealing); accord, Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d
175, 181 (7th Cir. 1948) (alternative holding) (basing point pricing),
affid, 336 U.S. 956 (1949) (per curiam). In Beech-Nut, the Court upheld
the Commission's finding that a chewing gum manufacturer's refusal to
deal with discounting dealers violated FTC Act § 5. Although the Commission found that the manufacturer had not entered into an express
agreement with its customers to maintain resale prices, FTC v. BeechNut Packing Co., 1 F.T.C. 516, 528 (1919), rev'd, 264 F. 885, 891 (2d
Cir. 1920), rev'd, 257 U.S. 441 (1922), the appeals court interpreted the
decision below as finding a tacit understanding, 264 F. at 891, see 1
F.T.C. at 522 (finding that dealers were reinstated only after they provided assurances that they would maintain resale prices), and the
Supreme Court may have accepted the appellate view, see 257 U.S. at
456 (enjoining the termination of dealers unwilling to provide assurances
of their willingness to maintain designated prices). Alternatively, the
Supreme Court may be understood as authorizing the Commission to
proceed under § 5 against a unilateral practice that would have violated
the Sherman Act had it been concerted. Under this interpretation, the
Supreme Court's Beech-Nut decision is controlling precedent improperly
contradicted by the Ethyl holding. For an interpretation of the Supreme
Court's Motion Picture decision that suggests this decision is controlling
precedent inconsistent with the Ethyl holding, see Kovacic, supra note 7,
at text accompanying notes, 210-225.

Section 1 dilemmas : 213
Second, on judicial review of agency actions, the FTC is entitled
to deference in its construction of § 5. The Supreme Court has
established this rule both as a general principle of administrative
law145 and as a specific instruction to the appellate courts in
reviewing actions of the FTC.1 46 Against this background, it is a
challenge to understand the legal basis under which the Ethyl
panel imposed the novel legal requirement that the FTC prove an
agreement or other indicator of oppressiveness in order to condemn as unfair a practice facilitating collusion in an oligopoly. 47
145
When a statute is "silent or ambiguous" with respect to a specific
legal question, a court may not "simply impose its own construction on
the statute" but must instead ask "whether the agency's [interpretation] is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Moreover, an agency's construction of a statutory scheme it must administer should be accorded "considerable weight," especially when the
agency's policy choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies committed to the agency's care by statute. 467 U.S. at
844. Cf. Dyk & Schenck, Exceptions to Chevron, 18 ADmiN. L. NEWS 1
(1993) (describing limitations to the principle of judicial deference to
agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes).

146 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 225-26 (1968); F.T.C. v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948); see FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1986) (when conduct violates FTC
Act § 5 because it violates Sherman Act § 1, "some deference" is given
to the Commission's "informed judgment," where the latter term encompasses both the agency's "legal rationale" and its "factual findings").
'47
Cf. 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 58, at 1436a (Ethyl decision not
"definitive" in confining the reach of FTC § 5; some unilaterally adopted
facilitating practices should be reached under that statute). The Second
Circuit panel justified this requirement as necessary to protect respondents against the possibility that the FTC would abuse its power, 729
F.2d at 139, notwithstanding the court's general power to review the
rationality of the Commission's determination that the benefits of prohibiting the challenged practices exceed the costs. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(1988); see generally E. GELLHORN & M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS IN A NUTsHELL 105-09 (3d ed. 1990); Boise-Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (overturning an FTC ban on delivered
pricing in the plywood industry because the Commission failed to
demonstrate that the practice had an anticompetitive effect).

214 : The antitrust bulletin

Even if the Ethyl panel correctly interpreted § 5, its construction of the statute does not necessarily require the Commission to
demonstrate an agreement or other indicator of oppressiveness as
a prerequisite to banning by rule practices facilitating industry
coordination. The strongest argument otherwise is that to permit
the FTC to promulgate a rule without such a demonstration would
allow the Commission to evade the restrictions imposed by the
appellate panel. But this position has repeatedly been rejected by
the Supreme Court. The Court routinely permits administrative
agencies to regulate conduct by rule without considering certain
evidence that the agency would have been required to review had
the agency attempted to regulate the identical conduct through
adjudication, so long as the agency provides for an exception
when a regulated entity can demonstrate extraordinary circumstances requiring a waiver. 48 Moreover, the Court encourages
148
When adjudication under a statute would require an administrative
agency to consider factors X and Y, the agency may nevertheless promulgate a rule under the statute that permits it to regulate conduct after the
examination of factor X alone, so long as the regulated entity is permitted
to seek an exception from the rule on a showing of extraordinary circumstances involving factor Y. American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 111
S. Ct. 1539 (1991) (in reviewing the scope of proposed employee bargaining units in acute care hospitals, the NLRB may promulgate a rule
that ignores the size, location and work-force organization of those hospitals save in extraordinary circumstances); Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964) (agency may promulgate a rule prohibiting
across-the-board certain contractual provisions in agreements between
gas suppliers and pipelines, while providing the regulated entities with a
procedure for seeking a waiver of the rule); United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (the Federal Communications
Commission may limit the television stations owned by any one firm to a
specified number, while providing that each regulated firm may seek a
waiver of the rule). Indeed, an agency may promulgate a rule that permits
it to regulate conduct after the examination of a factor Z that would not
be relevant in an adjudication, so long as the regulated entity can apply
for an exception upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances involving factors X and Y. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (the
Department of Labor may promulgate a rule for the determination of disability benefits that assesses a person's ability to work from guidelines in
part based on age, but does not permit a disabled worker to present evidence of individual competence to perform the jobs for which the guide-
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agencies to issue rules in preference to adjudication in generating
agency policy, recognizing that the gains from more efficient governmental administration typically outweigh any reduction in procedural protection to the regulated entities that derives from in
effect shifting the burden of proving special circumstances from
the agency to those entities. 149 Consequently, the Commission is
likely able to ban by rule practices that facilitate supracompetitive
pricing, without the need to satisfy the Second Circuit's requirement for an adjudication that it prove an agreement or other indicator of oppressiveness.
Informal rulemaking offers several advantages to the Federal
Trade Commission over adjudication for addressing industry
practices facilitating or enhancing oligopoly coordination. 150 Most
importantly, informal rulemaking is likely to be a less burdensome
and time-consuming method of enjoining a practice facilitating coordination than adjudication.151 In contrast with adjudilines presume an ability; the worker is permitted, however, to offer evidence that the guidelines do not apply to him); Airline Pilots Ass'n v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (the Federal Aviation Agency
may promulgate a rule forbidding individuals 60 and older from piloting
aircraft, without permitting each pilot to demonstrate physical fitness and
piloting competence; although individual pilots were permitted to seek an
exemption, the court suggested that it would have upheld the rule had no
exemption procedure been available), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.3 (3d ed.
1991); accord, Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,
678-85 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
150 Agencies receive deference in their choice of whether to employ
149

rules or adjudication, R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS § 6.41 (2d ed. 1992), even when the resulting rule
applies only to a single firm. Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 118
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
151 Although informal rulemaking can be expensive and take time to
complete, it is likely preferable to adjudication on these grounds. The
Ethyl litigation took 4 years to resolve at the FTC, between the initial
complaint and the final Commission order banning delivered pricing and
price protection provisions in contracts with customers. The price-fixing
suit brought by several states against the major oil companies, seeking to
prohibit the practice of providing advance notice of dealer tankwagon
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cation, in issuing competition rules the Commission need not
prove that the firms in the industry have engaged in anticompetitive acts; the FTC may prohibit conduct as unfair when its com1 52
petitive harm outweighs its benefit.
Yet rulemaking at the Federal Trade Commission has been
under a cloud for over a decade. One concern is the large rulemaking record required, the extensive hearing necessary to create
such a record, and the length of time required to complete the
prices in trade publications, has not yet reached trial, 7 years after the
first complaint in the consolidated proceeding. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432 (9th
Cir. 1990) (overturning grant of summary judgment to defendants), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991). Had these proceedings been framed as
informal rulemakings at the FTC, they could not have been more cumbersome and burdensome. (By comparison, a recent general counsel of the
Environmental Protection Agency stated that an informal rulemaking
would take two years and cost $2 million dollars. Remarks of E. Donald
Elliott, Law and Contemporary Problems Conference on Regulating Regulation: The PoliticalEconomy of Administrative Proceduresand Regulatory Instruments, Duke University School of Law, Nov. 13-14, 1992.)
Moreover, the imposition on informal rulemaking of analytical requirements beyond those originally thought to have been mandated by the
APA (such as the judicial insistence on a reasoned explanation for rules
beyond the APA's requirement of a concise general statement of basis
and purpose), a major source of the increased burden and delay in informal rulemaking throughout administrative practice, does not create
requirements more stringent than those imposed on the FTC and the
courts when antitrust enforcers seek to prohibit through formal adjudication practices thought to facilitate coordination. See McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DutKr L.J. 1385,
1400-07 (1992).
152
The substantive content of an informal agency rule is given
relaxed review judicially. So long as the rule is reasonably related to the
statutory purpose and rationally connected to the factual record, it will
not be stricken as arbitrary. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 149, at § 4.4;
E. GELLUORN & M. LEVIN, supra note 147, at 96-102, 113. There is no
requirement that the agency adopt the least restrictive alternative in promulgating a rule. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 149, at § 4.4. As discussed at
note 135 supra and accompanying text, the FTC likely must also provide
a procedure by which the regulated firms could apply for a waiver of the
rule upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances.
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rulemaking process. This concern is based upon the Commission's
recent experience with promulgating consumer protection rules
under a statute that mandates extensive procedural requirements,
however, not with the informal rulemaking procedures that would
be employed to promulgate rules proscribing unfair methods of
competition. The notice and comment procedures available for
competition rules are less cumbersome, less complex, and less
time consuming than the trial-type hearings required before the
FTC may promulgate consumer protection rules. 153
Three other concerns are also cited by those dubious about the
promise of rulemaking as an alternative to adjudication at the
FTC. First, industry-wide rulemaking is thought to raise unusually
difficult political problems for the agency. These problems arise
because the targeted industry can often mobilize congressional
51
support more readily than can the protected class of consumers.
Yet there is no reason to expect the lobbying efforts of the affected
industry to be any less if the oligopoly's practices are challenged
through adjudication rather than rulemaking. Second, some contend that staff attorneys, concerned about career development, are
unlikely to pursue rulemaking passionately because rulemaking
will not give them trial experience. 155 Many attorneys find that
other government positions provide rewarding careers without
offering trial experience, however. Finally, rulemaking is sometimes thought inappropriate because rules may quickly become
outdated in a changing economy. Yet to the extent this concern is
not obviated by waiver provisions contained in a rule, it can be
addressed by incorporating an "automatic sunset" provision when
153
Consumer protection rules are promulgated pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act procedures. The adoption of these procedures has
slowed the pace of FTC rulemaking. McGarity, supra note 152, at
1388-40.

Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission,
58 AMTITRUST L.J. 43, 89 (1989).
155
R. KATZMAN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: TIlE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POUCY 190-91 (1980).
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a rule is initially promulgated that limits the application of a rule
156
to a specified term of years.
Although these concerns are legitimate, they do not outweigh
the benefits of rulemaking in filling the gap in antitrust enforcement to combat the oligopoly problem. If enforcers at the FTC
can identify a practice that facilitates coordination, they can
address the social harm of oligopoly through rulemaking, without
the necessity of proving concerted action to fix price or to adopt
the challenged practice. Depending on the facts of an industry, the
FTC might prohibit, for example, price protection guarantees
to customers, delivered pricing (rather than f.o.b. pricing), or
advance announcements of price increases.1 57 The rulemaking
inquiry will be fact-based and industry-specific; in other industries the identical practices will be procompetitive.
The ability of rulemaking to address the harmful conduct of
oligopolies will turn on the extent antitrust enforcers are able to
identify industries performing poorly, 58 and whether they are able
to identify practices that facilitate coordination in such industries.
It will not turn on the problem bedeviling adjudication: the need
to demonstrate that the firms have reached an agreement to fix
price or to adopt the facilitating practice. Of course, it will not
always be possible to improve industry performance through rule156
Moreover, the concern that rules may become outdated over time
is no greater than would apply to an order following an adjudication.
Accordingly, this concern does not counsel against adopting competition
rulemaking rather than adjudication to address the unreasonable practices
of oligopolists.
157
These practices are similar to those challenged by the FTC in the
Ethyl litigation, and by the Antitrust Division in the GE-Westinghouse
consent modification proceeding.
158 Recent innovations in empirical industrial organization economics
may facilitate the task of identifying industries exercising market power.
Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 76. The Federal Trade Commission has
the power to collect industry information through compulsory process in
order to apply such tools systematically. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1988); see
generally, P. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 11.03[2] (1989).
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making. Even if a practice that facilitates coordination can be
identified-and it will not always be possible for enforcers to do
so-the benefits to competition from the practice may outweigh
the harm. Yet in the context of a legal environment in which the
difficulty of demonstrating an agreement under Sherman Act § 1
has increased, and an economic environment in which oligopoly
coordination is often plausible, renewed attention to addressing
harmful conduct through rulemaking should be high on the
antitrust enforcement agenda.

